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INTRODUCTION
During the course of the last quarter of the century, many have posited
a need to develop approaches to resolving disputes that avoid full traditional
litigation. Privatization of dispute resolution is among the suggested routes.
A number of concerns underlie the alternative dispute resolution-
privatization effort: (1) anxiety over a so-called "litigation explosion" that
some say is clogging our courts; (2) a general sense that even though there
are too many lawyers and too much law, the average person and many
commercial enterprises are left out of the system and cannot get help at a
reasonable cost when and how it is needed; (3) a consensus that traditional
court processes often unnecessarily exacerbate hostility; and
(4) proliferation of new types of litigation such as many types of
discrimination cases and mass tort class actions often involving hundreds of
thousands of plaintiffs, multiple defendants, and difficult problems of
science.
In some areas, with the approval and encouragement of government and
other policy-making bodies, the business of justice is being encouraged to
leave the courts for alternative forums. This privatization of dispute
resolution must be considered in the context of our fundamental public
commitment to provide substantive justice on an equal basis to all people.
We must not close the courthouse door to those who need the courts'
protections. More justice, better administrated, is what both proponents of
new and old forms should seek.
Absorption of Alternative Dispute Resolution into public and private
institutions is pervasive.' ADR has been incorporated into court procedures
(and more inclusion is urged), 2 government contracts, 3 contracts between
1 See generally Edward A. Dauer, Manual of Dispute Resolution, ADR Law and
Practice (1994); William K. Slate H, Arbitration Comes of Age, AM. LAW., May 1995, at 8
(pervasiveness of ADR); Judith Resnik, Rereading 7he Federal Courts": Revising the
Domain of Federal Courts Jurispnudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1021, 1051-52 (1994) (competition between private dispute resolution forums and
federal courts for cases); Judith Resnick, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 2 (1995); HNRP Launching New
Fellowship Program in Law and Negotiation, NEGOTIATION HARv. LAW SCHOOL
NEwsLETRm, Fall-Winter 1995-1996, at 1, 5.
2 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (1990) (directing courts
to consider authorizing referral of "appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution
programs'); 28 U.S.C. § 473(b) (4)-(5) (neutral evaluation programs and settlement
conferences); UNITED STATES DIsTRIcr COURT FOR THE EASTERN DIsTRIcr OF NEw YORK,
DisPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE EASTERN DISTRICr OF NEW YORK (1992)
(describing several programs-arbitration, early neutral evaluation, mediation, trial before
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magistrate judges, settlement conference and appointment of special masters-available in the
Eastern District); Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and Agenda for Ovil Justice Reforms
in the States, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1553, 1570 (1994) (more use of alternatives to trial); Michael
L. Seigel, Progmasm Applied: Imagining a Solution to the Problem of Court Congestion, 22
HOFSTRA L. REV. 567 (1994) (less than full trials).
See generally Symposium on Cavil Justice Reform, 46 STAN L. REV. 1285 (1994); JACK
B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 88 (1995) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE]; Donna Stienstra & Thomas E. Willging, Alternaves to
Litigation: Do They Have A Place In the Federal District Courts? (Federal Judicial Center
1995) [hereinafter Stienstra & Willging, Alternatives]; CENTER FOR PuBuC RESOURCES,
JUDOB'S DESKBOOK ON COURT ADR (Elizabeth Plapinger et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter
JUDOE'S DESKBOOK]; Planning for the Future: Results of a 1992 Federal Judicial Center
Survey of United States Survey of United States Judges (Federal Judicial Center 1994); David
Krafka & Carol Krafka, Voluntary Arbitration in Eight Federal District Courts: An Evaluation
(Federal Judicial Center 1994); Barbara S. Meyerhofer, Court-Annexed Arbitration in Ten
District Courts (Federal Judicial Center 1990); State Justice Institute, National Center for State
Courts, National Symposium on Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Research (Susan Keilitz
ed., 1994); National ADR Institute for Federal Judges, Transcript (Harv. L. Sch. Nov. 12-13,
1993); CPR Inst. for Dip. Resol., EuZABETH PLAPiNOER & MARGARET SHAw, COURT ADR,
ELEMENTS OF DESIGN (1992); SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PUBLIC SERVICES DIVISION,
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GROUP, 1993 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY;
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RESOURCE PAPERS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, MEDIATION: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL AGENCIES (1994); THE RIGHT
HONOURABLE THE LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1995) [hereinafter WOOLF REPORT];
THOMAS R. COLOSI & CHRISTOPHER B. COLOSi, Fed. CtS. Study Committee, REP. OF THE
FED. CTS. STUDY COMMITTEE 57-64 (1990); Jack B. Weinstein, Warning: Alternative
Dispute Resolution May Be Dangerous to Your Health, LmTro., Spring 1986, at 5 [hereinafter
Weinstein, Warning]; Jack B. Weinstein, The Lesson of Mass Tort Litigation in the United
States: The Need for Consistency and Cooperation in the Utilization of Scientific Evidence by
the Courts, THE FORUM FOR US-EC LEGAL-ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, THE MENTOR GROUP,
LONDON, Sept. 19, 1995 [hereinafter Lesson].
See also, e.g., COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (2d prntg. 1995)
[hereinafter PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN]. But cf. Kim Dayton, 7he Myth of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889 (1991).
3 See the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104
Stat. 2736 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 9 U.S.C. § 10, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2672, 29 U.S.C. § 173, 31 U.S.C. § 3711, and 41 U.S.C. §§ 605, 607) (directing federal
agencies to "adopt a policy that addresses the use of alternative means of dispute resolution
and case management" in connection with "(A) formal and informal adjudications; (B)
rulemakings; (C) enforcement actions; (D) issuing and revoking licenses or permits; (E)
contract administration; (F) litigation brought by or against the agency; and (G) other agency
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individuals and businesses, 4 contracts between businesses and businesses, 5
and statutorily mandated relationships. 6 One senior partner at a major New
York law firm estimates that he spends almost half his time mediating
disputes-as a special master to the courts or by request from attorneys
involved in litigation. 7 Much of the other half is spent using ADR
techniques to develop settlements for his own clients.8 Law firms interested
in exploring settlement are increasingly resorting to ADR on their own
initiative-for example, by arranging privately choreographed "mini-trials"
at which both sides present arguments and evidence to the CEOs of the
disputing companies, even as litigation is pending in a traditional forum.9
Ethical rules are being developed to govern arbitrators' activities.10
actions"). Agencies are directed not to use ADR (1) where there is a need for precedential
value; (2) in certain situations involving "significant questions of Government policy"; (3)
where "the matter significantly affects persons... who are not parties to the proceeding"; (4)
where a "full public record is. .. important"; or in certain other situations. 5 U.S.C. § 572.
The Act's sunset provision terminates the authority granted under the statute on October 1,
1995.
With the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969
(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581-90), Congress authorized agencies to engage in
"negotiated," as opposed to "adversarial," rulemaking when the head of the agency
determines it is in the public interest. On ADR in the administrative agencies, see generally
THOMAS R. COLOSI & CHRISTOPHER B. COLOSI, MEDIATION: A PRIMER FOR FEDERAL
AGENCtEs (1993).
4 See irfra Part IH.A (securities cases).
5See discussions infra Part V.C.
6 See, e.g., the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1994); Felt v. Atchison, T. &
S.F. Ry. Co. 60 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1995) (construing RLA's mandatory arbitration
provisions governing "minor" disputes).
7 Interview with Edwin J. Wesely, Senior Litigating Partner, Winthrop, Stimson,
Putnam & Roberts, in Brooklyn, N.Y. (Mar. 23, 1995).
8 Id.
9 Id. A number of for-profit businesses will assist law firms in setting up simulated
trials, complete with mock juries and one or more neutral decisionmakers. See, e.g.,
DECISION RESEARCH BROCHURE OF DECISION RESEARCH (Lexington, Massachusetts 1995)
(describing preparation of jury trial simulation, and other techniques, available as part of
consulting firm's litigation services) (on file with author). In many instances, a law firm will
arrange to do the simulation internally, without participation from the other side, and use the
results in counseling their clients on the desirability of pursuing settlement or going to trial.
Telephone interview with Ann Laaff, Principal, Decision Research, Lexington, Mass. (Mar.
28, 1995).
10 See Code for Mediators is Gaining Approval, DISPUTE RESOLUTION TIMES, Fall
1994, at 8 ("Proposed Standards of Conduct for Mediators have been approved by the
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Case law assures the immunity of court-appointed administrators and neutral
evaluators for actions taken within the scope of their official duties." The
immunity of others, particularly special masters, is not clear. 12
Courts are not only capable of meeting many of society's dispute-
resolution demands, they remain the preferred fora for doing so in many
cases. In theory, if not always in practice, everyone is equal in the courts;
mechanisms exist to help redress imbalances and protect against manifest
injustice. Such a commitment is absent from many forms of private,
extrajudicial dispute resolution. Some forms even seem cynically designed
to exploit information and resource imbalances between the parties. 13
Widespread privatization of dispute resolution has the potential to stunt
the common law's development as entire areas of law are removed from the
courts; deprive the public of important information, such as news of a
product's harmful effects; deny plaintiffs the therapeutic benefit of having
their "day in court;" degrade constitutional guarantees of the right to a jury
trial; and prevent public debate and consensus-building in cases with
national public policy implications. 14
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution (SPIDR)."); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for 7hird-Party
Neutrals, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIGATION, Sept. 1993, reprinted in
JUDGE'S DESKBOOK , supra note 2, at 87, 89.
11 See, e.g., Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1314 (1995).
12 See, e.g., Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. Inc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452, 1454-55 (9th Cir.
1993) (absolute quasi-judicial immunity extended to special masters appointed by district court
judges); Church of Scientology Int'l v. Kolts, 846 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (same);
Boston v. Lafayette County, Miss., 744 F. Supp. 746 (N.D. Miss. 1990), afid, 933 F.2d
1003 (5th Cir. 1991) (same). On the potential liability of special masters, see generally
Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY
L.J. 927, 981-82 (1994) (discussing potential liability of special masters, even assuming
judicial immunity for their juridical and administrative actions); Margaret G. Farrell, The Role
of Special Masters In Federal LItigation, 842 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 931, 961-62
(1993) (same).
13 See discussion infra Part Iil.A (securities cases).
14 On the drawbacks of ADR, see, e.g., Stienstra & Willging, Alternatives, supra note
2, at 14-16 (pros and cons); Janice A. Rochl, Private Dispute Resolution, in COURT REFORM
IMPLICATIONS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 128, 133 (Conference Proceedings for the Ohio State
University College of Law 1995); Robert L. Haig & Steven P. Caley, How Clients Can Use
Federal Court ADR Methods to Achieve Better Results, 5 FED. LITu. GUIDE RE'. 193, 194
(1994); Weinstein, Warning, supra note 2, at 5. See also, e.g., Harold Brown, Antitrust in
Arbitration, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 28, 1995, at 3 (discussing the split in cases where the public
policy in favor of arbitration may dilute the antitrust policy).
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We should proceed cautiously in replacing our courts with alternative
fora. Extrajudicial dispute resolution should often be a supplement to, not a
substitute for, court-based adjudication. Its availability should not replace
required procedural and substantive reform if the courts are to be able to
handle properly those cases before them.
The term "alternatiVe dispute resolution" has been used to refer both to
procedures and to institutional structures for dispute resolution. In its forum
sense, it invokes the panoply of dispute resolution institutions that do not
involve the courts, including intra-industry treaties to arbitrate disputes,
administrative agency ombudsperson services, contractual agreements to
arbitrate disputes, and others. In its procedural sense, it invokes dispute
resolution tactics that depart from the litigation norm-mediation, summary
jury trials, mini-trials, judicial referral of cases to magistrate judges and
settlement masters-whether employed by the courts or by extrajudicial
dispute resolution bodies.
ADR refers to a variety of techniques, each implicating different levels
of privatization. First, there is the panoply of private ADR methods. By
preagreement, as through contract provisions or through industry-wide
treaties and regulations, the parties agree to resolve future disputes
according to arbitration or some other ADR method. The court may only
become involved if asked to enforce the agreement or arbitrator's decision.
Second, there is court-annexed ADR, which typically consists of mediation,
arbitration, or early neutral evaluation. In some districts, it may also
include the use of "summary jury trials" and "mini-trials." Third, there are
a variety of techniques that judges use in handling cases without full dress
litigations. Our goal in developing adjuncts to our courts and new
procedures in courts is to improve the functioning of society's entire
complex peaceful dispute resolution system.
This article is mainly concerned with "alternative dispute resolution" in
its forum sense. Parts I and III the historic and ongoing importance of the
courts as public centralized dispute-resolution forums in our modem
democratic and pluralistic society. Part IL discusses the threat posed by some
forms of privatization of justice to substantive values protected and given
effect by the courts. Part IV discusses some of the rationales proposed for
supporting increased privatization of justice, questions some misperceptions
about traditional adjudication that underlie the arguments favoring
privatization, and suggests ways in which the court system can better meet
modern demands. Part V identifies some areas appropriate for extrajudicial
dispute resolution. Part VI touches on some implications for criminal cases.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF CENTRALIZED, PUBLIC LAWMAKING
Privatized dispute resolution may be viewed as the latest element in a
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
series of initiatives designed to limit the availability of a centralized public
forum for airing and resolving grievances. Yet,
[a] hallmark of our system of democratic government has been that private
individuals, including the disadvantaged or less powerful segments of our
society, have access to the political and legal processes, and that
governmental decisionmaking is open to public scrutiny. 15
Before permitting traditional court functions to be supplanted by private
dispute resolution approaches, it is useful to reflect on the central role of the
courts in society's dispute resolution system of the past and the reasons for
preserving that centrality in the future.
A. Establishing Norms of Behavior
The courts' functioning must be put in a social context, as part of a web
of institutions that enable people to live together peacable. We have learned
to see legal institutions as part of a larger ecology in which various dispute
institutions interact and effect one another. As these interconnections
become common knowledge, those who would design or justify legal
institutions must accept responsibility not only for the small world of
adjudication, but for the larger world of disputing and bargaining in which
it is set. 16
One theorist has explained that the law serves two functions: to
15 LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY COMMITrEE OF THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, PUBLIC ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIvATE DIspuTE RESOLUTION: IMPLICATIONS,
ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1993), reprinted in JUDGE'S DESKBOOK, supra note 2, at 87.
16 Mare Galanter, Compared to What? Assessing the Quality of Dispute Processing, 66
DENV. U. L. REV. xi, xi (1989); see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Sevle":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994). Galanter
and Cahill explain:
[Clourts (and other dispute resolvers) do more than resolve disputes; they
broadcast messages to various audiences about the conduct of disputes and about
the norms of conduct underlying those disputes.... In addition to the effects on
the actors involved in a dispute, there may be other effects on wider audiences
through communication of information about the dispute (and about responses to
that information). ... Every case has possible general effects-for example, as a
deterrent for future actors or as precedent for future decisionmakers. Patterns of
practice as well as individual instances may have general effects.
Id. at 1379.
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influence behavior in accordance with established norms of what is
acceptable behavior and to provide standards of enforcement for the
bureaucratic state. 17
For law to serve its function as giving expression to enforceable
behavioral norms, it must be made publicly for all to see. This is true both
of substantive lawmaking through common law development and of
adjudication in individual cases.
Principled decisions are reasoned and public. As such they become
known, feed expectations, and breed a common understanding of the legal
culture of the country, to which in turn they are responsive and
responsible. The courts are not formally accountable to anyone, but they
are the most public of governmental institutions. They are constantly in
the public gaze, and subject to public criticism. Thus their decisions both
mould the public culture by which they are judged and are responsive to
it.... It is a requirement for justification by reference to the common
values and shared practices of the legal culture.18
Members of the public must know what the law is if they are to predict
the probable outcomes for acting a certain way, and modify their behavior
accordingly.1 9
The need for public law-making and enforcement is especially
important in a pluralistic society. In a homogenous society, the norms given
effect by the law are generally community norms.20 A basic familiarity with
the principles, if not specific proscriptions and admonitions, can be
assumed. Custom and formal law, intertwined, can be counted on to
normalize an individual's behavior.
In a pluralistic society, people cannot be presumed to be familiar with
any one system of norms merely by virtue of their membership in that
society. Each sub-community has its own value system. 21 While there are
17 David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on Civil
Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND RES. J. 425.; see also Galanter & Cahill, supra note 16, at
1379 (distinguishing between law's "specific effects" (effects on the parties) and its "general
effects" (effects on a larger audience)).
18 See JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBuC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALTY OF LAW
AND POLircS 358-59 (1994) (describing "bureaucratic" and "community" law models).
19 1d. at 355.
20 q. Susan S. Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal
Scholarship: From Instinwaonal Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridicial Subject, 66
DENV. U. L. REv. 37, 464-66 (1989) (discussing relationship between the formal legal system
and cultural norms) (citing Engel, supra note 17)
21 Se, e.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Americans Despair of Popular Culture, N.Y. TIMES,
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substantial overlaps in the values of individual communities, those
imbrications may be "insufficient to provide a common understanding of the
justice of various ways of organizing family life and other personal
relations" and of the reasonableness of the economic structure of the state
and its civil liberties. 22
This problem of divergent community ideologies was revealed
dramatically in the recent revelations about the oppressive conditions under
which illegal Thai immigrants labored in a California sweatshop. 23 Most
Americans, who are accustomed to workplace regulations and wage and
hour laws in particular, intuitively know that such conditions are illegal.24
Those responsible for the sweatshop, news articles suggested, may not have
sought to violate the law so much as to replicate conditions commonplace in
their country of origin. 25
B. Public Law Making in a Participatory Democracy
In a representative democracy such as ours, the people must know when
the law is changing-whether through the initiative of legislators or
judges-so that they can protest innovations they find objectionable. Since
our social customs, economic organizations, and technology are changing,
the law must be modified appropriately to meet these new conditions. What
Aug. 20, 1995, at B1.
22 Raz, supra note 18, at 357.
23 Kenneth B. Noble, Thai Workers are Set Free in California, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,
1995, at Al.
24 But see recent reports of terrible conditions in migrant labor camps in the South.
Manuela Fernandes, Medical Woes Trail Migrants; Georgia Program Gives Some Basic Care
to Seasonal Workers, ATLANTA JOURNAL, July 19, 1995 at 3C (describing severe health,
environmental, and working conditions in migrant labor camps); John Lantigua, Migrants'
Lives Filled With Fear and Crime, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 5, 1994 at B2 (describing
vulnerability of Florida migrant labor camps to crime).
25 See Kenneth B. Noble, Los Angeles Sweatshops are Thriving, Esperts Say, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 5, 1995, at A6. Jack Kyser, chief economist of the Economic Development
Corporation of Los Angeles, explained:
A lot of times you get people coming from offshore and setting up these shops, because
it's a very easy industry to get into and you don't need a lot of capital .... But in many
cases they don't understand all the rules and regulations they have to comply with and
all the forms they have to fill out.... They're probably doing business like they did it
in the country of their origin, but in the United States, they're breaking the law.
Id.
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this new law should be, and how society should react, is a fit subject for
public debate.
C. Public Forums and Public Security
Public lawmaking is integral to how our society maintains a healthy
collective psychology and sense of security. A criminal act may hurt only
one person directly, but its prosecution by the state reflects the entire
community's sense of vulnerability, hurt, and outrage.26 Similarly, the
negligent act by a defendant in a civil product liability suit may indirectly
touch many who never used the particular product, but who may become
wary of an entire industry because of a particular defendant's act. 27 The
public wants the reassurance that the state will protect them provided by an
open process. In our current environment, protection of the public through
both administrative agency control of dangerous products, and
compensation through a health and security system, sometimes offer a better
alternative to the traditional court system. 28 This is not, however, what its
opponents think of as ADR.
D. Public Forums and the Process of Healing
A public forum may also be important to the individual litigant. There
is a therapeutic effect in public grieving of disputes. 29
II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF DISPUTES IN OUR MODERN,
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY
As society becomes more complex, so too do its ever-growing disputes.
This process is reflected in our cases.30
2 6 KEN GREENAWALT, PUNISHMENT (1982); United States v. Smith, 893 F. Supp. 187
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (victim's statement and interest of groups affected in punishment).
27 D.M. BURLEY Elr AL., PRODUCT LTABILITY INSURANCE AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY: AN ANOLO-AMERICAN COMPARISON (Geraint G. Howells ed., 1991).
28 WEINSTrN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 163.
29 But see Galanter & Cahill, supra note 16, at 1378 (discussing 'personal
transformation" of parties through settlement process); Sara D. Schotland, Mediarion and
Arbitration of Product Liability Cases, PROD. SAFETY & LLAB. REP. (BNA) No. 28, July 21,
1995, at 752 (asserting that "[t]he 'therapeutic' aspects of mediation should not be
overlooked. Plaintiff may welcome the chance to tell his or her side of the story and express
feelings of suffering or anger.").
3 0 WEINSTE N, supra note 2, at 16 ff.
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A. Increasing Complexity of Litigation
We are seeing a change in the nature of the cases in the courts.
Consider the typical "mass tort," which may involve millions of plaintiffs,
dozens of defendants, difficult scientific problems, and seemingly
insurmountable choice-of-law problems.31 Mass tort litigations, such as
those involving toxic torts that we have seen in the Eastern District of New
York-for example, DES, asbestos, and Agent Orange-challenge old ways
of resolving disputes.
The development of mass tort litigation was an inevitable consequence
of the nationalization of commerce. We no longer live in a world of local
manufacturers piecing together products made from local raw materials for a
local community. Consumers are as apt to pick up a telephone, with credit
card in hand, and order a product from a state halfway across the country,
as they are to walk to the corner store. Products are developed for a national
or international market. Raw materials or parts may come from one
country, subassembly and final assembly may be performed in others, and
the finished product may be sold in yet another.32 Each step of the process
creates new litigation possibilities.
With the development of an international economy, the harm caused by
a defective product increasingly will affect the lives of people spread across
the country and the globe. We see this with the breast implants cases, where
the equitable treatment of non-United States claimants was a substantial
obstacle to settlement. 33 The international community will have to mobilize
to ensure that claimants are treated fairly across geographical boundaries,
just as it has mobilized to address trade, health, environmental, and other
problems.34
31 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 540-42 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing the substantive choice-of-law problem).
3 2 Byron Acohido, Expansion Erpress-Airlines, Air-Freight Companies Enter High
Stakes Arena of Global Delivery, SEATTLE TIMES, June 3, 1990, at El.
33 Michael Unger, Implant Deal Splits Foreign, U.S. Women, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug.
20, 1994, at A15 (consideration of defendants' motions to dismiss foreign plaintiffs' claims on
grounds of forum non conveniens, and more generally of the problems of foreign plaintiffs in
securing compensation for their injuries); see In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liability
Litig., 887 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1995).
34 Weinstein, Lesson, supra note 2. Many ADR insights can be applied to the area of
mass torts. See Task Force [ofAAA] to Study Mass Torts, DIsPUTE RESOLUTION TIMES, ADR
NEws FROM THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, Winter 1995/96, at 1; ADR is the
Key to Class Action Settlement, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIGATION, Jan. 19,
1996, at 1 (CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution); Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, A
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B. Increasing Reliance on the Courts Due to Loss of Community
New litigation has also resulted from the breakdown of families,
communities, neighborhoods, and ethnic, cultural, and religious institutions
as stabilizing social forces in society.35 Professor Marc Galanter has
identified what he calls "indigenous forums"-hospitals, schools,
condominiums, churches, and others-that operate by reference to "codes of
conduct" independent of, although probably overlapping with, the law.
36
The attraction of the courts as dispute resolvers may be inversely
proportional to the strength of such institutions. When these institutions
fail, and when the social and ethical pressures which they bring to bear are
insufficient to mollify the parties, the courts remain to provide the certainty
of a resolution of some sort.
The law that used to control everyday life was an amalgam of religious
and moral precepts, painted with a broad brush and enforced almost
exclusively through community control.37 In a world of closely-knit
communities, in which everyone knew what everyone else was up to, this
kind of pressure was surprisingly effective. The rule "do unto others as you
would have them do unto you" is no mere abstraction when those "others"
live in close quarters and see you every day.
Today, families are widely scattered across the country. They are often
embattled with alcoholism, divorce, and abuse of spouses, children, and the
aged. We no longer know the people who grow our food or make the
products we use. Small neighborhood shops have all but disappeared in
most places. The communities existing sixty years ago, in which the law
functioned-and which helped enforce the law-have largely vanished,
except among a relatively few groups.
Few of our people experience community in that way in modem times.
An exception are the fundamentalist communities-Jewish, Christian, and
Muslim-in which the word of God is enforced, as literally as possible,
through strict peer pressure. 38 For most of us, fundamentalism is not an
Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (1995).
35 See Elizabeth Shogren, Traditional Family Nearly the Exception, Census Finds, L.A.
TIMEs, Aug. 30, 1994, at Al (analyzing census data showing demise of the "traditional" two-
parent family).
36 See Galanter, supra note 16, at xiii.
37 See Ya'akov Habba, Compromise in Jewish Law, JusTicE (International Association
of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, Tel Aviv, Israel), May 5, 1995, at 40.
38 See Randy Kennedy, Jews and Muslims Share a Piece of Brooklyn, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 17, 1995, at Al (describing Brooklyn neighborhood in which Orthodox Jews and
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option we choose to embrace. In our world neither religious law nor
community pressure regulates most behavior.
Without strong communities, or strict adherence to religious law, the
legal system must be all things to all people. 39 Increasingly, we depend on
the secular legal system to tell us how to live. Today, even children have to
be aware of the law, because it controls so much of what they do.
Enforcement of behavior comes increasingly from the courts, rather than
from religion, the family, or the community:
[W]e are connected to each other in the nature of the claims we make
against each other: we do not ordinarily resort to self-help or depend upon
various informal social groups like churches, families, or friends to take
up our cause. Instead, we invoke our system of law, both because we
have come to have faith in it and because we have largely abandoned
other alternatives. American "community," consequently, now means
only our ingrained expectation of official non-arbitrariness. 40
Although the law can do much in a democratic country such as ours,
community and individuals bear a heavy responsibility for preserving
harmony. Community is essential for enforcing civilized behavior. An
encouraging trend is the proliferation of community-based dispute
resolution facilities4' that help counter "a culture of adversarial legalism." 42
observant Muslims are discovering common ground in their different forms of devout
religious observation and community life).
39 See Timothy P. Terrell & James H. Wildman, Rethinking 'Professionalism," 41
EMORY L.J. 403, 422 (1992). Terrell and Wildman note:
[The legal system embodies our last remaining vestige of a sens of "communty"-of
shared values and expectations. All the other dimensions of our lives--race, religion,
education, the arts, regional loyalty, and so on-divide us as much as they join us
together because they are based on matters of "substance" on which we so often
disagree.
Id.
40Id. at 423.
41 See 1993 DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECIRY, SECTION OF DISPtrrE
RESOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC SERVICES DIVISION GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS GROUP, AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCATION (302-page book listing hundred of facilities across the country);
CONCILIATION & ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Bar Association of Nassau County)
(1995) (brochure for bar associations dispute-resolution program).
42 See Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry W. Schreiber, Legal Cultures and the Legal
Profession, BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. , Feb. 1995, at 6, 7.
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That said, we must reckon with the intense involvement of civil law in our
everyday lives.
Not all disputes that appear to be individual or personal should be
resolved locally. Some "personal" disputes implicate national policy. The
decision to leave them to local community resolution has political
overtones.
Reflect on domestic violence. Historically viewed as a private matter
between a husband and wife,43 in recent years it has been recast as a kind of
social pathogen requiring national policymaking. 44 Individual cases,
however, still pit two concerns against each other: on the one side,
preserving the autonomy of the family unit and personal privacy; on the
other, preventing the abuses that may be perpetuated when society looks the
other way. 45 Notwithstanding the developing national consensus decrying
violence in the home, some police remain reluctant in individual cases to
intervene in husband-wife disputes. 46
A recent case from the Second Circuit, Eagelston v. Guido,47 illustrates
the political aspects of the determination of what type of forum is the proper
dispute resolution facility. A woman asserted that the police department's
preference for mediation in favor of arrests in domestic violence cases
violated the equal protection clause by treating some victims differently
from others. The federal appeals court rejected her claim:
A community may decide that mediation makes more sense, or is more
promising, in disputes between members of the same family, or between
neighbors, than in disputes between strangers, or that Family Court or
counseling is a useful alternative to the criminal courts in certain
43 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Essay, Crimes of War, Crimes of Peace, 4 UCLA
WOMEN'S LJ. 59 (1993) (men's "private acts" against women left out of human rights
analysis).
44 See generally The Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat.
1796 §§ 40001-40703 (1994).
4 5
ee Deborah L. Rhode, Feminism and the SUte, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1181, 1187
(1994) (failure of liberalism to account for women's experience of inequality through
perpetuation of the public/private distinction); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Prostituion and ivil
Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13, 115 (1993) (definition of spheres as "private" intended
to prevent public intervention, leading to perpetuation of abuse); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE LJ. 1281, 1307 (1991) (need to consider
sexual assault a "public" concern).
46 See, e.g., Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
53 (1995) (equal protection claim alleged on basis of police policy favoring mediation over
arrest in domestic violence cases).
47 Id.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
situations. These considerations may impact arrest statistics without
violating the equal protection clause.
48
C. Multiculturalism, New Rights, New Litigation
Another source of new litigation is increased sensitivity to social
injustice, and the attendant creation of legally enforceable rights intended to
assist the previously disenfranchised. Consider the example just described of
our decision, as a society, to treat domestic violence as a matter of national
concern. Once it was established that women have a right not to be battered,
the courts become a natural forum for enforcing those rights. If society
intervenes in a domestic dispute by arresting the spouse, it is the spouse
who may go through the court system as a criminal litigant. If society fails
to intervene, then it is the plaintiff who goes through the court system
through a civil case to enforce her right to obtain protection from her
husband.
Cycles of litigation attend recognition of and creation of new rights. As
sensitivity to racism, sexism, or other forms of injustice develops, the
government responds by setting up new sets of rights. The new formally
recognized rights create the possibility of litigating disputes. Conflicts that
were previously private, hidden, and unrecognized surface and enter the
courts. A period of intense litigation follows. Companies concerned about
avoiding litigation, for example, promulgate guidelines and hire experts to
sensitize their employees. Assuming there is no backlash, things settle down
after a while. We are seeing this cycle at work in relation to sexual
harassment, racial integration, decisions to protect workers' rights to jobs
and retirement funds, and various of the other social transformations of the
last few decades.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR THROUGH
PRIVATIZATION OF JUSTICE
Procedures, jurisdictional rules, and other seemingly neutral devices
that affect people's ability to use the courts are part of a complex set of
social relations. Any device-whether ADR or changes in formal litigating
procedure-that makes it more difficult to get into court, has a substantive
effect on how people see their rights in the real world.49
4 8 Id. at 878. This implies increased emphasis on mediation in quani-criminal family and
neighbor disputes. See Infra part VI.
4 9 See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are
the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1901, 1922 (1989); Jack B.
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The movement to privatize justice must be put in the context of a
variety of recent procedural and substantive modifications designed to limit
plaintiffs' access to the courts. 50 These modifications include reducing
venue over defendant corporations in diversity suits; 51 increasing minimum
amounts in diversity cases;52 increasing the complexity of pleading
requirements;53 increasing the availability of summary judgment;5 limiting
the availability of habeas corpus relief;55 instituting "loser pays" rules in
civil tort litigation; 56 shortened statutes of limitation such as those in
proposed tort reform measures;57 and increasing the availability of sanctions
under Rule 11.58 Access to the courts may be implicated in fee-setting,
59
Weinstein, The Fiffeth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54
BROOK. L. REv. 12, 28 (1988); cf. Galanter, supra note 16, at xii ("Even where it can be
shown that one process is cheaper and faster than another, such a demonstration is necessarily
incomplete, for it is necessary to ask whether what is obtained for the lower cost is equally
desirable.").
50 See Stienstra & Willging, Alternatives, supra note 2, at 57 ("Mandatory ADR
amounts to tort reform under the guise of court reform and has the subtle effect of diminishing
opportunities for jury trial for most litigants by reallocating court resources to alternatives.");
See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law
Revision, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 827, 832 (1993) [hereinafter Weinstein, Procedural Reform];
Anthony Lewis, 7llting the Scales, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995 at A19. For a discussion of the
current political struggle, see, e.g., Martha M. Hamilton, Product Liability Bill Facing Veto,
HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 17, 1996, at Al, A14; Richard B. Schmitt, Planned Veto of
Liability Bill Is Business's Loss, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 1996, at A2, A6; Judith Resnick,
Procedural Innovations, Sloshing Over: A Comment on Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full,
A Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution In Mass Personal Injury
Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (1995).
51 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (1988).
52 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
5 3 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) as interpreted.
54 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
55 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993); Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722 (1991).
56 See supra note 50.
5 7 See supra note 50.
58 Rule 11 as amended was inconsistent with "the liberal access policy of the Federal
Rules and the overall American system of rewarding risktaking in the bringing of lawsuits."
Weinstein, Procedural Reform, supra note 50, at 836. Fortunately, this "reform" has been
abandoned. FED R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note ("to remedy problems that have
arisen in the interpretation of the 1983 version of the rule").
59 See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 108 ("Recommendation 90:
Litigants should pay reasonable filing fees and certain services above a basic level should be
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lack of resources to appoint counsel in civil cases, 6° and failing to provide a
court process comprehensible to laypeople, particularly potential pro se
litigants and foreign-speaking litigants.
61
The resistance of the appellate courts to consolidations in cases such as
those alleging repetitive stress syndrome62 and those brought by
hemophiliacs who contracted HIV from tainted blood63 can be considered
part of the same pattern of restriction of plaintiffs' access to the courts.
Consolidations of cases may, in many situations, offer the only real hope
for recovery by plaintiffs faced with great discovery and expert witness
costs in individual cases.
As a society, have we grappled openly and intelligently with how we
are going to allocate this increasingly scarce resource--the federal and state
courthouse?64 Are we in danger of shutting the courthouse door to the have-
nots with the excuse of procedural and substantive reform?65 Any change
which increases the difficulty of bringing suit will have a disproportionate
effect on the poor and relatively powerless. 66
funded by reasonable user fees.").
60 C. Jon Newberry, Staying Alive, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 89 (describing
vulnerability of Legal Services Corporation in era of reform-minded, budget-cutting
Congress).
61 See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 108-09, 112-14; Jack B.
Weinstein, Advice to Criminal Defendants in Criminal Cases, translated into Spanish,
Chinese, and French (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
62 In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993).
63 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). Compare the
Japanese settlement of H.I.V. cases based partly on an apology. Andrew Pollock, Japanese
Suits on H.L V.-Tainted Blood Settled, N.Y. TIMES INT'L., Mar. 15, 1996, at A3.
64 See Galanter, supra note 16, at xiv ("[S]orting disputes by their suitability to
particular dispute processes is not a technical exercise but a political choice of which kinds of
disputes deserve which kinds of response, which in turn reflects our commitments about the
good society and the good life.").
65 Weinstein, Procedural Reform, supra note 50, at 832-34; see also Sherman, supra
note 2, at 1559 (suggesting that channelling cases to ADR is more attractive to policymakera
than direct "tort reform" since it is a neutral "process" seemingly removed from ideology).
66 See Lewis, supra note 50, at A19 (noting the effect of proposed tort reform measures
will be to "insulate the rich and powerful from being called to account at law"); Burton D.
Fretz & Ethel Zelenske, Judicial Conference Weighs Cutbacks in Federal-Cour Jurisdiction,
28 CLEARINGHOUsE REv. 1261, 1265 (1995) ("Perfect justice inside the courtroom becomes
meaningless if the courthouse doors are closed to the poor."). Seeking to keep the courts
abreast of developments in the ADR system, the Federal Judicial Center has issued a number
of monographs. See, e.g., Steven Hartwell & Gordon Bermonth, Alternative Dispute
Resolution in a Bankruptcy Court: The Mediation Program In the Southern District of
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A. Exacerbation of Power Imbalances
Acting as neutral umpires, courts traditionally have had to look out for
parties who lack the resources or the capacity to protect their own interests
in the face of a better-funded or more-informed adversary. 67 It was an
aspect of this "equalizing" of the formal legal system that the ancients
sought to capture in the code of Hamurabi, and which Pericles evoked as he
lay on his death bed in Fifth Century B.C. Greece:
Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands not
of a minority but of a whole people. When it is a question of settling
private disputes, everyone is equal before the law . . . . [J]ust as our
political life is free and open so is our day-to-day life in our relations with
Cal4fornia (Federal Judicial Center 1988); M. Daniel Jacoubovitch & Carl M. Moore,
Summary Jury Trials in the Northern District of Ohio (Federal Judicial Center 1982); E. Allan
Lind & John E. Shepard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal District
Courts (Federal Judicial Center 1983); Barbara S. Meierhoefer, Court-Annexed Arbitration in
Ten District Courts (Federal Judicial Center 1990); Stienstra & Wiliging, Alternatives, supra
note 2; Kathy L. Shuart, The Wayne County Mediation Program in the Eastern District of
Michigan (Federal Judicial Center 1984); Karl Tegland, Mediation in the Western District of
Washington (Federal Judicial Center 1984). State court systems are making similar efforts.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Noonan & Judith M. Bostetter, Alternative Dispute Resolution In
Wisconsin: A Court Referral System, 78 MARQ. L. Rzv. 609 (1995); Peggy L. Chown & John
H. Parham, Can We Talk? Mediation in Juvenile Cases, F.B.I. LAW ENFORCEMENT BULL.,
Nov. 1995, at 21; Proposed Final Report of the Chief Judge's New York State Alternative
Dispute Resolution Project, Court-Referred ADR in New York State, Sept. 1, 1995.
Arbitration by federal agencies in public contract cases is also being encouraged. See Tenaska
Washington Partners H L.P. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 434 (1995) (federal agencies not
barred from entering into agreements to submit to binding arbitration).
67 See PROPOSED LONo RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 66. The Judicial Conference
explained:
Private forms should be encouraged, but the federal courts must not shed their
obligation to provide public forums for disputes that need qualities that federal courts
have traditionally provided, including at a minimum a neutral and competent decision-
maker and the protection of weaker parties' access to information and power to negotiate
a dispute. Court supervision of ADR programs may be the only means of ensuring
satisfaction of those conditions in some cases, although referral to private dispute
resolvers may well serve as part of a court-supervised program.
Id. at 66.
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each other. We do not get into a state with our next-door neighbor if he
enjoys himself in his own way, nor do we give him the kinds of black
looks which, though they do no real harm, still do hurt people's feelings.
We are free and tolerant in our private lives; but in public affairs we keep
to the law. This is because it commands our deep respect.
We give our obedience to those whom we put into positions of authority,
and we obey the laws themselves, especially those which are for the
protection of the oppressed, and those unwritten laws which it is
acknowledged shame to break. 68
In every case, the judge has an obligation to do what he or she can to
ensure that mismatching of resources will not skew the substantive result. If
a judge believes that the factual record has not been well presented, he or
she can turn to magistrate judges and appointed special masters to develop
it. If a party fails to provide a good brief on the law, the judge can turn to
law clerks and potential amicus for research to supplement the briefings.
Arbitrators, especially those drawn from industry panels, may not feel
the same responsibility to produce a full factual and legal record.
Alternatively, they may lack access to resources to make up for imbalances.
The problem is more than academic, as the experience of dispute-
resolution in the securities industry demonstrates. 69 Corporations and
businesses familiar with the "ins" and "outs" of the federal and state
arbitration laws have engaged in strategic behavior that puts consumers at a
disadvantage. For example, brokerage firms have long drafted customer
contracts providing that disputes would be arbitrated and that New York
law would govern.70 What consumers ignorant of the law never found in the
small print was that New York law forbids arbitrators to award punitive
damages.
71
The Supreme Court, in Mastrobuono v. Shearson, Lehman Hutton,
Inc., recently refused to apply the New York law on punitive damages to
one such contract, finding insufficient evidence that the petitioners intended
to give up their right to such damages. 72 The Court explained that: "[a]s a
68 Pericles' Funeral Oration, in 2 THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 117 (Rex
Warner trans., Penguin Books 3d prig. 1959).
69 See generally Norman S. Poser, Wen ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New
World ofSecurities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095 (1993); Floyd Norris, What to Do
About BrokerArbftrations?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 23, 1996, at Dl.
70 Karen Donovan, The Arbitration Question: Why No Punitive Awards?, NAT'L LJ.
NEW YPic, Jan. 23, 1995, at Bl.
71 See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1976).
72 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 1212 (1995); see also
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practical matter, it seems unlikely that [the investors in the case] were
actually aware of New York's. .. approach to punitive damages, or that
they had any idea that by signing a standard-form agreement to arbitrate
disputes they might be giving up an important substantive right" when they
agreed to be bound by New York law. 73 The problem of investor ignorance
implicated in Mastrobuono becomes more acute as Congress moves to
discourage security fraud court cases. 74
The fact that members of arbitration panels are often drawn from
industry management increases potential unfairness to the consumer.75
Contracts of adhesion reflecting imbalances in power and knowledge
between the parties are routinely invalidated by the courts. As the
Mastrobuono decision demonstrates, mandatory arbitration clauses cannot
be the exception to the courts' skeptical treatment of adhesion contracts. 76
B. Creation of Two-Tiered System of Justice
ADR is "viewed by many as the most promising bridge over the gap
between legal needs and affordable services." 77 There is the risk, however,
UInda Greenhouse, Court Backs Investors on Damage Awards, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1995, at
D5.
73 Mastrobuono, 115 S. Ct. at 1219.
74 See Weinstein, Procedural Reform, supra note 50, at 832-34.
75 Peter F. Blackman, Arbitration Suit Asserts Constitutional Arguments, NAT'L LJ.,
Feb. 27, 1995, at BI, B2. Other aspects of arbitration that may be of concern are the lack of a
written record and findings of fact and law, and the right of arbitrators to disregard statutory
law in reaching their decisions. Id.
76 See, e.g., Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert..
denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995) (employees not bound by signed agreement to arbitrate
discrimination claims where they did not knowingly forego statutory remedies in favor of
arbitration); Steven A. Holmes, Employers' Ability to Require Bias-Case Arbitration is
Curbed, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 23, 1994, at A28 (discussing Prudential); cf. Blackman, supra
note 75 (discussing recently filed case, Duffleld v. Robertson, Stephen & Co., that raises
Seventh Amendment due process and right to jury challenges). State laws requiring full notice
of possible arbitration clauses in consumer contracts are appropriate. See, e.g., Casarotto v.
Lombardl, 886 P.2d 931 (Mont. 1994) (notice must be placed on front page); Stephens v.
American International Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995) ("anti-arbitration" provision in
Kentucky statute governing insurer liquidation valid). See also Harold Brown, Application and
Limits of Allernative Dispute Resolution, N.Y. LJ., Jan. 25, 1996, at 3, 6 (limits on federal
preemption of state legislation protecting against "arbitration surprises").
77 James Podgers, Chasing the Ideal: As More Americans FInd Themselves Priced Out of
the System, the Struggle Goes on to Fulfill the Promise of Equal Justice for All, A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1994, at 56, 60; see also Silbey & Sarat, supra note 20, at 450-52 (discussing aspects
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that as the rich move out of the courts to private dispute resolution forums,
only criminals and the poor will be left in the courts, thus, reducing the
effective power of these institutions over all society.
78
A recent news report confirms the immediacy of the threat that
increased resort to ADR will result in creation of "a two tier system of
justice." 79 According to the report, California's "three strikes law" is
forcing diversion of civil judges to criminal trials to handle the increased
caseload. 80 With the public resources to handle civil cases shrinking, some
are predicting that one day only the rich will have recourse to civil
litigation-by hiring private judges as provided for under California law.
We can imagine without much difficulty a future "in which wealthy litigants
will use private ADR while the poor and powerless will be consigned to
public courts which government will have little incentive to fund because
their constituents lack political clout."81 This would create a situation
analogous to what has happened to public education in some of our central
cities because of the middle class exodus to private schools and the suburbs.
C. Reduced Protection of the Public Welfare
Another problem with extrajudicial dispute resolution is that no one
may be monitoring the disclosures made during a process with an eye to the
public's interest and welfare.8 2 The amenability of ADR to developing
of "access to justice" arguments made in support of ADR).
78 See, e.g., Podgers, supra note 77, at 61 (describing funnelling of cases out of the
courts to disadvantage of poor people and criminal defendants).
79 Haig & Caley, supra note 14, at 194.
80 Fox Butterfield, '3 Strikes' Law in California is Clogging Courts and Jails, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1995, at Al, BI 1.
81 Haig & Caley, supra note 14, at 194; see also Podgers, supra note 77, at 61
(drawing analogy between harm to public education due to loss of public support, and
potential harm to public court system if big institutions exit the system for private dispute
resolution); CONFLICT MANAGEMENT NEwsL' TER (Sec. of Litig., Am. Bar Assoc.), Winter
1994, at 1, 2 ("[Mlandatory arbitration would hurt parties of lower economic means who
could not afford the process costs of taking a second bite at the apple offered by a trial de
novo.").
82 See, e.g., Borzou Daragahi, Environental ADR, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 8, 1994, at 5. See
generally William H. Schroder, Jr., Private ADR May Offer Increased Confidentialty, NAT'L
L.J., July 25, 1994, at C14. Parties in a civil case may always sign a nondisclosure agreement
when they settle, but the judge may reveal the proceedings in the interests of public policy.
See Id. (discussing cases); cf. Cerisse Anderson, Sealing Order Granted for Partial
Senlements, N.Y. LJ., Aug. 9, 1994, at I (granting protective order concerning amounts
paid in partial settlement of repetitive stress injury suit, citing public policy in favor of
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resolutions in which discovery, admissions of liability and damages remain
undisclosed is seen by some to be part of ADR's attraction.83 The problem
is not endemic to extra-judicial resolution; any time a case is settled, there
may be attempts to keep under seal a good deal of the information that
surfaces in discovery.
There may be a public interest in having the information revealed. In a
products liability suit, for example, the potentially negative health affects of
a particular pharmaceutical may not yet have been publicized. The courts
themselves are not always sufficiently cognizant of their obligation to
society to prevent the privatization of vital information which affects the
public welfareA'
At least in the courts, judicially supervised procedures must be
followed before documents and judgments will be placed under seal.8 5
Documents can be unsealed later if need arises.86 These protections, while
institutionalized in the court system, may be lacking in the context of
extrajudicial dispute resolution.
D. Denigration of Right to Jury Trial
A concern with mandatory arbitration, and court-annexed mandatory
arbitration in particular is the loss of the right to trial by jury.8 7 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission has stated its opposition to use of
such mandatory procedures in workplace disputes, including claims of
settlement).
83 See Anderson, supra note 82; see also Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating
Judgments, Preferences for Settlement, and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the
Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471, 1494 & n.87 (1994). Professor Resnik explains
that "express rights of public access have not accompanied the more recent creation of court-
sponsored settlement negotiations and alternative dispute resolution techniques." Id. She
asserts that in the absence of legislation stating otherwise, court-annexed arbitration awards
"become judgments of the court and ...fall under general rules of public access to court
records." rd.
84 WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 66.
85 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (6)-(7) (sealing of depositions and material relating
to "trade secrets or other confidential research," "for good cause" as "justice requires"). See
generally 8 CHARLES A. WRiUHT r AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2042
(1995).
86 See WRIOHT ET AL., supra note 85, § 2044.1 ("Modification of Protective Orders").
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liability Litig., 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987), cer. denied, 484
U.S. 926 (1987).
87 See G. Thomas Eisele, 7he Case Against Mandatory Court-Annexed ADR Programs,
JUDICATURE, June-July 1991, at 34.
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discrimination. 8
Yet, resolving disputes before they get to court is hardly denial of the
right to a jury. In the Eastern District of New York, the Long Island
Marriott Hotel uses a panel of employees to adjudicate disputes about
management discipline of employees. 8 9 They keep discrimination issues out
of court while employer-employee relations are improved. Additionally,
consumers are increasingly turning to credit card companies such as
American Express to mediate disputes with merchants, thus avoiding the
small claims court.
VI. RESPONSES TO TRADITIONAL RATIONALES FOR PRIVATIZING
JUSTICE
A. Court Docket Pressures
A recurrent theme in the rhetoric of those advocating an increased role
for ADR and other procedural reforms that implicate the accessibility of the
courts is the need to respond to a so-called "litigation explosion. " 9° For
example, to put into context its suggestions for procedural and substantive
law reform, the recently issued Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal
88 See Richard C. Reuben, Two Agencies Review Forced Arbitration, A.B.A. J., Aug.
1995, at 26.
89 Kirk Johnson, You're Fired! See You Out of Court; Using In-House Panels to Keep
Disputes Within a Company, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at BI.
90 C. THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S.
COURTS OF APPEALS 32 (1994) (noting prevalence of "[h]yperbole and metaphor" among
those seeking to justify court reform by the increased volume of cases); William K. Slate H,
Arbitration Comes of Age, AM. LAWYER, May 1995, at 8, ("[F]aced with staggering
backlogs, state and federal courts are now formally urging attorneys to turn to dispute
resolution services for cases that do not, per se, require a judge."). The classic formulation
states:
With the spiraling costs, excessive delays, and exploding caseloads of the civil courts,
many disputants view traditional litigation as unable to meet their conflict resolution
needs. More and more parties are turning away from the judicial system and are
resorting to private dispute resolution firms. Recognizing this growing trend .... an
increasing number of state and federal courts are offering a wide range of ADR
mechanisms to litigants.
Lucille M. Ponte, Putting Mandatory Summary Jury Trial Back on the Docket:
Recommendations on the Exercise of Judicial Authority, 63 FORDHAM L. REv. 1069, 1069-70
(1995).
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Courts describes a "[p]ossible [s]cenario for the [fluture" that sounds like
legal armageddon. 91 The report assumes that "the federal courts' civil and
criminal jurisdiction [will] continue[] to grow at the same rate it did over
the past 53 years" to paint a "nightmarish" picture of the docket in the year
2020: civil cases exceeding 1 million, criminal cases reaching 900,000,
appeals approaching 325,000, expansion of the federal bench to 4,000, and
a "babel" of federal common law.92
1. The Pressures are Overstated
While no one can predict the future with accuracy, the recent empirical
data concerning the present situation suggests that claims of a litigation
explosion are grossly overstated.93 Nevertheless, many judges do think that
there is a problem. 94 As a result, their enthusiasm for using ADR to handle
the volume of cases is fairly high.95 Contrary to the view held by the
Chicken Littles of the world, tort filings have declined in many states since
1986.96 Some states that have initiated tort reforms, such as limits on
9 1 PRoPoSED LONG RANas PLAN, supra note 2, at 18-19.
92 1d.
93 See Stienstra & Wdllging, Alternatives, supra note 2, at 33-35 (noting that "in the
aggregate, federal civil caseloads have been decreasing in recent years," and that "the civil
trial rate... is already very low and has been steadily declining for the past decade in nearly
all federal courts, those with ADR and those without ADR alike"); see also Eisele, supra note
87, at 34, 38 (one judge's experience suggests that claims of unmanageable dockets are
"hyperbole"); Eric Moller, Trends in Civil Jury Verdicts Since 1985, xiv-xv (Rand Institute of
Justice 1996) (Trial rates-as measured by the number of verdicts per capita-are generally
flat or decreasing. This could reflect stable or decreasing filing rates; it could aalo reflect an
increased tendency to settle rather than try cases. In either event, the number of civil cases
reaching verdict is not climbing dramatically."); But cf. Caseload Increases Throughout
Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 1996, at 1, 2.
94 The Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey to determine the nature and severity
of the problem in the Federal Court. Planning for the Future: Results of a 1992 Federal
Judicial Center Survey of United States Judges (Federal Judicial Center 1994). With respect to
the "[v]olume of civil cases," federal courts of appeals judges responded as follows: 7.4%
said it was "[nlot a problem at all"; 10.1% "[a] small problem"; 30.9% "[a] moderate
problem'; 33.5% "[a] large problem"; 13.3% "[a] grave problem." Id. at 3. Federal district
judges seemed less disturbed; their answers were, respectively: 18%, 16.1%, 33.5%, 22.7%,
8.1%. Id. at25.
95 See Id. at 43 (44.9% of court of appeals judges, and 55% of district court judges,
"moderately" or "strongly" agreed that "[t]here is a need for ADR in my court due to the
volume of cases").
96 John E. Morris, Bar Talk; By the Numbers, AM. LAW., June 1995, at 18.
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punitive damage awards and modification of joint and several liability for
damages, have actually experienced an increase in tort filings, while others
have seen a decrease. 97 While much of the "litigation explosion" is said to
be the result of peoples' filing suit for any physical injury, the data suggests
that people are reluctant to use the courts. 98
The situation in the federal courts is mixed but suggests no civil
emergency. Total filings in the federal courts declined by eight percent in
1994 compared to 1993. 99 This figure represents a three percent increase in
civil case filings, 1°° including an eighteen percent increase in product
liability and personal injury cases,101 and a three percent decrease in
criminal case filings.102 The decrease in the federal criminal docket reflects
a drop in drug cases, probably due to staff problems and changes in
Department of Justice policies deemphasizing prosecution of small-scale
offenders. 103
In the Second Circuit, where the author sits, the court of appeals and
the district courts have recently experienced net decreases in both civil and
criminal filings. 104 The author's experience in the Eastern District of New
York, one of the busiest districts in the federal court system, 10 5 is that
criminal prosecutions of low-level drug mules and expansion of criminal
jurisdiction to areas traditionally left to the states are what is burdening our
97 id.
98 See Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F. Supp. 530, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Harvard
Medical Malpractice Study, Patients, Doctors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice
Litigation, and Patient Compensation In New York (1990); DEBoRAH R. HENSLER Er AL.,
COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (Rand, R-3999-HHS/ICJ,
1991)).
99 Edward A. Adams, New Filings Down in Second Circuit, District Courts, N.Y. LJ.,
Apr. 3, 1995, at 1.
100 Id.
101 Report Rejlects Judiciary's 1994 Caseload, THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 1995, at 1, 2
[hereinafter Report].
102 Adams, supra note 99, at 1.
103 Report, supra note 101, at 2 (drg cases declined by 7% in 1994, following a 5%
drop in 1993).
104 Adams, supra note 99, at 1. Filings in the court of appeals declined by 8% during
the period; district court civil case filings decreased by 1% and criminal case filings by 10%.
Id.
105 See Letter from Hon. Eugene H. Nickerson, Senior Judge, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, to Hon. Otto R. Skopil, Jr., Chairman,
Committee on Long Range Planning, Judicial Conference of the United States, Dec. 1, 1994,
at 2 ("The district presently stands first within the Second Circuit and fifth among all ninety-
four districts in the number of pending cases and weighted filings per judgeship.").
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dockets. The experience with large increases in alcohol cases in the twenties
and thirties and the drop-off after prohibition was abolished suggests that a
shift towards a medical-educational model in drug control may lead to a
reduction of criminal drug cases. It seems doubtful that the public will want
to continue indefinitely paying the huge price for our unnecessarily punitive
incarceration policies.
2. Flexible Procedures and New Technologies Can Make the
Docket Pressures Manageable
a. Procedures
i. Setting Trial Dates
Perhaps the most significant step that a judge can take to propel a case
to resolution is to set a trial date. Recognizing this factor, the Civil Justice
Reform Act identifies "setting early, firm trial dates" as a "principlef- and
guideline of litigation" to be considered by the federal courts as they
develop their civil justice expense and delay reduction plans. 106 Another
possible suggestion, one that also has been put forward in connection with
proposals to modify the English and Wales civil justice systems, is to preset
the amount of time that will be allocated for trial. 107 Case management can
undoubtedly be somewhat improved.10 8
ii. Consolidation
In complex litigations such as mass torts, the case management
challenges can be better met through creative use of existing procedures,
particularly methods of consolidation. 109 The legal and factual problems do
not vary greatly among plaintiffs injured by the same substance or
106 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (2) (B) (1995).
107 C. WOOLF REPORT, supra note 2, at 20 ("The maximum length of any trial should
be pre-determined and that length should only be exceeded for good reason.").
108 See David W. McKeague, Differentiated Case Management Can Help Make ADR
More than an "Intermediate Irritating Event", FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec. 1994, at 12, 13
(advocating "use of early scheduling conferences to discuss the issues and merits of each case,
including the feasibility of ADR and the assignment of cases to tracks"); see also WOOLF
REPORT, supra note 2, (support, in context of British and Welsh civil reform effort, for
different tracks for different types of cases).
109 See Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort
Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 269. See generally WEIN9STEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note
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instrumentality. 110 Aside from its case management benefits, consolidation
may be necessary as a resource-pooling device to initiate and fund scientific
research needed to determine liability.III
Each of the tools currently used to consolidate cases-the multi-district
litigation ("MDL") statute, 112 the class action device and bankruptcy
jurisdiction-has significant drawbacks. Consolidation under the MDL
statute, for example, is limited only to pretrial proceedings. Class actions
are useful, but certification of classes is often hampered by the outdated
nature of our conflicts and personal jurisdiction law.11 3 Some procedural
and substantive aspects of tort law must be "federalized" if we are to
resolve mass disasters fairly and efficiently.
Appropriate national consolidation of multi-state cases has been
discouraged by the fact that each state has its own substantive law, and by
the outmoded constitutional jurisprudence of personal jurisdiction which
remains based on 19th century assumptions. The Seventh Circuit, in
denying certification of the class action brought by hemophiliacs exposed to
HIV-tainted blood, cited the "esperanto" nature of the proposal to
homogenize the fifty different states substantive law of torts in the class
action. 114 The author faced similar problems in Agent Orange, the Manville
Asbestos cases and the DES cases and they were not insuperable. Only
through consolidation by class action, bankruptcy and other devices, and by
appropriate handling of the state law-Erie problem, was a satisfactory
110 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
("While those close to the American law scene tend to emphasize the diversity of substantive
law among the states and between the states and the federal government, to outside observers
much of the differences must appear as significant as that among the Lilliputians to Swift's
her."). But see In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting
"esperanto" to meet variations in state law).
111 See Braune, 895 F. Supp. 547; Weinstein, Lesson, supra note 2, at 13-18.
112 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1995) (permitting consolidated pretrial proceedings for "civil
actions involving one or more common questions of fact pending in different districts").
113 See Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global
Revolution of Mass Ton Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. DAvis L.
REV. 917 (1995). Another problem is appellate court skepticism about class certification,
some of which is well-founded and some of which may be based on appellate judges' lack of
awareness of the practicalities of the trial court. As an example of the latter see In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (denying certification of class action
brought by hemophiliacs infected with AIDS through use of defendants' tainted blood
products); In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting
consolidation of 44 cases in the Eastern District of New York asserting claims for repetitive
stress injuries).
114 In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1299.
[Vol. 11:2 1996]
PRIVATIZATION OF JUSTICE THROUGH ADR
resolution obtained.
A comprehensive approach to these national problems is preferable to
the ad hoc solutions that have been adopted in individual cases. 115
Unfortunately, some proposals for national tort reform are somewhat less
than sensitive to the varied interests at stake. 116 How to balance efficiency
offered by consolidation of dispute resolution in a single forum with the
desire to preserve the individual states' sovereignty and the desire of
litigants to control their own disputes is vexing, but can be resolved. 117
Where a claim is based on a contract that calls for arbitration, class
arbitration may be useful. For example, in Keating v. Superior Court
(Southland Corp.),"18 a California court found the authority to consolidate
claims for class-wide arbitration. In contrast, however, the Seventh Circuit
court of appeals held in Champ v. Siegal Trading Co.,119 that a district
court lacks authority to certify a class arbitration action in the absence of a
specific authorizing provision in the parties' arbitration agreement. 120
115 C. Linda J. Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2131 (1989) (describing how proliferation of judicial adjuncts
and specialized rulemaking has undermined the uniformity and transubstantivity of the federal
rules, and arguing for broad procedural reform building on the courts' experiences in these
areas). But cf. Edwin Wesely, The Cvil Justice Reform Act; The Rules Enabling Act; The
Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; CIRA Plans; Rule 83-What Trumps What?, 154
F.R.D. 563 (1994).
116 The Common Sense Product Liability Legal Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 1042
Cong., 2d Sega. (1996), and currently being considered in the Senate, would limit consumers'
ability to recover in product liability actions-both state and federal-in a number of ways.
Among its provisions, it (1) places caps on punitive damages; (2) eliminates joint liability with
respect to noneconomic loss damages; (3) establishes a two year statute of limitations,
triggered from when the claimant discovered his or her harm and its cause, for product
liability actions; (4) establishes a 15 year statute repose in product liability actions measured
from delivery of the product; and (5) limits liability of product sellers, renters and leasing
companies. At the time of writing, the measure was expected to be approved by both the
Senate and House of Representatives in the spring of 1996, and to face a Presidential veto.
Neil A. Lewis, Backers of Limirs on Lawsuits Win a Victory in the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 1996, at A22.
117 AMERICAN LAW INSTrruTE, COMPLEX LmOATION PROECzT (Tentative Draft No. 3,
Mar. 31, 1992); WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 42.
118 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
119 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
120 For other cases finding no authority to engage in class-wide arbitration, see Julie A.
Signoriello, 7he Resolution of Class Actions, N.Y. LJ., July 6, 1995 at 3-4.
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b. Judicial Adjuncts
The wise and selective use of a full array of judicial adjuncts is one key
to preserving the courts' ability to render justice in the face of more cases of
greater complexity. 12 1 Such aides include magistrate judges and special
masters. In resolving the Agent Orange and other multiparty litigations, the
author relied heavily on such judicial assistance. 122 They were invaluable in
determining what issues were at stake in these complex and often confusing
litigations, and in helping the parties move towards settlement. 123
i. Special Masters
Rule 53 authorizes the courts to appoint "special masters."124 Under
this rule "reference to a master" is to be "the exception, not the rule," in
cases where "the issues are complicated," and "only on a showing that
some exceptional condition requires it."125 Referral can also be by consent
of the parties, in which case the restrictions of Rule 53 may not apply. 126
121 See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 65. The Proposed Plan explains:
A conventional bench orjury trial is very expensive and not the best resolution for
every dispute initiated in the district courts. Often, a fair settlement by the parties, with
or without court involvement, is the preferable resolution for particular litigation. To
this end, the federal courts should be encouraged to offer a wide array of means and
methods for resolving civil disputes-while preserving the traditional trial process-
through settlement efforts by district judges and magistrate judges, by the effective use
of supporting court personnel, and by a variety of alternative dispute resolution
techniques that involve members of the bar and other adjuncts.
Id.
122 Hart v. Community Sch. Bd. of Brooklyn, N.Y. Sch. Dist. #21, 383 F. Supp. 699
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2.
123 See also PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 66 (advocating increased
reliance on special masters); cf. WOOLF REPORT, supra note 2, at 22 (describing the use of
"procedural judges" in various case management tasks in context of civil reform in England
and Wales).
124 See FED. R. CIv. P. 53; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); see also Margaret G. Farrell,
Special Masters, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 575, 595 (Federal Judicial
Center 1994) (authority to appoint special masters derives from four sources: consent of the
parties, the courts' inherent powers, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2) (1995), and FED. R. Civ. P. 53);
Jenron I. Braun, Special Masters In Federal Couri, 161 F.R.D. 211 (1995).
125 See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(b).
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1995); FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
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The special masters' powers are defined by the referral order.12 7 Subject to
the authorizing order, special masters "have many of the same powers that a
district judge has to receive and evaluate scientific and technical
evidence. " 128 In fact, special masters may have more flexibility-akin to
that of arbitrators-in "shap[ing] the rules of procedure to the particular
requirements of the case."129
The propriety of appointing special masters in bankruptcy cases is
subject to some dispute. 130 This consideration led the author to use a
semantic substitute-the court-appointed "special advisor"-in the Manville
Bankruptcy-Trust litigation. 131
ii. Magistrate Judges
In the Eastern District of New York, magistrate judges have
coordinated all pretrial discovery in civil cases. 132 Each case is
automatically assigned to both an Article III judge and a magistrate judge on
intake. 133 In addition to controlling discovery, Magistrate judges typically
do any intensive factfinding that is necessary to resolve pretrial issues.
Magistrate judges can be used to a greater extent than they are in many
127 See FED. R. CIV. P. 53(c).
128 Farrell, supra note 124, at 598; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c) (authority of special
masters to call and swear witness and parties, and require production of documents).
129 Braun, supra note 124, at 221.
130 See, e.g., .a Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957) (reference to special
master exceeding court's authority); Stauble v. Warrob, 977 F.2d 690 (1it Cir. 1992)
(similar); In re Bituminous Coal Operators' Assoc., 949 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(similar).
131 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 878 F. Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1995) (Mark Pederson, Special Advisor to the Courts).
132 See Eastern Distict's Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil
Cases, in UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS FOR THE SOUTHERN AND EASTERN DISTRICTS OF
NEW YORK, JOINT RULES FOR GENERAL, CIVIL, CRIMINAL, ADMIRALTY AND MAGISTRATE
JUDGE PROCEEDINGS 61, 62 (10th prtg. 1995). The Eastern District Rules provide:
A magistrate judge shall be assigned to each case upon the commencement of the
action [except in certain enumerated actions].... Except in multi-district cases and
antitrust cases, a magistrate judge so assigned is hereby empowered to act with respect
to all non-dispositive pretrial matters unless the assigned district judge orders otherwise.
Id.
133 Id.
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jurisdictions.134 We find them particularly useful in achieving settlements.
Court-Annexed ADR Programs. Some court-annexed programs provide,
in a sense, judicial adjuncts since they involve oversight by an Article III
judge.135 For example, in the Eastern District of New York, the
determination of whether to refer matters to an early neutral evaluation
panel is left to the judge assigned to the case. 136 Programs that involve
judicial oversight do not implicate the concerns otherwise associated with
ADR,13 7 and may be helpful in relieving court dockets. The author's own
experience with mediation and arbitration (once the case reaches him after
the magistrate judge has supervised discovery) has not been encouraging. If
the magistrate judge and the judge can not settle the case it will probably be
decided by trial or dispositive motion.
c. New Technologies
New technologies should be exploited to improve the public's access to
the courts and to streamline adjudication. Creative use of computers, on-line
services and other new electronic tools can increase the public's access to
the courts. On the Internet's World Wide Web, trivia, graphic images, court
transcripts and hourly news feeds can keep the public informed about the
details of trials that pique the public interest. 138 The Arizona Supreme Court
has developed an interactive computer system, Quickcourt, that uses text,
graphics and voice narration to provide instructions on court matters in
English and Spanish. 139 The system provides an overview of the Arizona
134 See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 93 (Recommendation 67:
"Magistrate judges should perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally permissible and
consistent with sound judicial policy. Individual judges should retain flexibility, consistent
with the national goal of full and effective utilization of all magistrate judge resources, to have
magistrate judges perform judicial services most needed in light of local conditions and
changing caseloads.").
135 See part V.A, infra (general discussion of court-annexed programs).
136 In contrast, referral for arbitration is automatically made by the clerk of the court in
matters involving amounts in controversy not exceeding $100,000. See UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW
YORK 6-8.
137 See supra part III.
138 Peter Lewis, Discussion of the O.J. Simpson Murder Trial is On-Line as Well as on
the Air, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1995, at AIS. The Congressional Record and various Library
of Congress resources are also accessible through the World Wide Web. Edmund L.
Andrews, Mr. Smith Goes to Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1995, at A22. See also
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2.
13 9Quickcourt was described in some detail in Lynn Wiletsky, Computerizing Justice,
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court system and information on landlord and tenant rights, alternative
dispute resolution, small claims and legal aid agencies. It can even produce
legal documents to be used in court proceedings, including the forms
necessary to file for divorce and calculate child-support payments. The on-
screen text is at the fourth grade reading level, and the multimedia aspects
of the system-audio, highlighting of key words-are designed to assist
poor readers. In its first year of operation, 24,000 transactions were
conducted.
Computers can also help increase the courts' accessibility to non-
English speaking litigants and defendants. I have developed a description of
how our criminal justice system operates for distribution to defendants
which has been translated into Spanish, French and Chinese. Such a
pamphlet for civil litigants would be useful and could be translated by
computer, as can other documents. 14
The technological revolution that has created some of the new forms of
actions also provides some of the tools for resolving them more efficiently.
Computers are already used to expedite case processing, for document
imaging and remote filing.t 4 1 In the breast implant litigation, electronic
transfer of all documents to CD-ROM disks pursuant to Judge Pointer's
order made discovery readily available to all attorneys at a reasonable
price. 142 At least one lawyer communicates with her clients to explain the
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 1995, at 23.
140 Our pro se clerk, an attorney, assists litigants who can not afford an attorney.
141 See generally Gordon Bermant & Winston D. Woods, Real Questions About the
Vrud Courthouse, JUDICATURE, Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 64; Julie Treidmen, Plugging in the
Courthouse, AM. LAW., Mar. 1995, at 12; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 481 (1995) (requiring automated
retrieval of case status in the district courts). Some courts dealing with the problems of
communicating with the hundreds of attorneys that may be used in complex mass tort cases
have resorted to computer bulletin boards. See, e.g., Ruth Piller, Computer to Court's Rescue,
Hous. CHRoN., Nov. 14, 1992, at A37. (f. Peter W. Martin, Prospecting the Internet,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995 (getting in touch with clients, locating resources, and participating in
expert fooms); David V. Vandagriff, A Storehouse of Resources, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1995, at
57.
142 Bill Rankin, New Imaging Technology Speeds Attorney's Access to Docunents,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 22, 1993, at A7. The documents were scanned using a high-
speed computer that created 2,000 images per hour and placed them onto a magnetic tape,
which was then transferred to CD-ROM disks. Each CD-ROM disk, containing 16,000 pages
of information, was sold together with an index required for searching purposes to lawyers for
$40. One person estimated that it would cost $1,600 in attorney and paralegal time and effort
to access the same amount of information in the traditional way. See also Meredith McClure,
litigants Create hdeir Own CDs, AM. LAW., Sept. 1993, at 100.
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status of the case using videocassettes. 143 We can foresee small claim cases
being filed from the local library and being decided in diffused courthouses
without walls.
Hearings and trials with participants in far-flung places, connected only
through links such as videoconferencing, have been used and widespread
utilization is not far away. 14  Potentially, some envision:
a courtroom where the physically separated participants make virtual
appearances in an electronically simulated three-dimensional space.
Testimony in this setting can consist of computer-simulated experiences of
virtual reality. . . . [F]act finders can explore evidence by putting
themselves in the middle of a chemical molecule or walking through a
burned-out building without leaving the comfort of their chairs. 145
We must proceed cautiously. The Internet is a superhighway for many;
for others it is an electronic fence. The "haves" and "have-nots" in society
are no longer defined solely in terms of imbalances in wealth, but also in
disparities in access to information. Many people are not sophisticated about
computers and others lack the resources to gain access to information
providers. The Internet, steeped in a tradition of public-minded, if anarchic,
civicism, is now in danger of transforming from a "cyberspace" into a
"marketspace" that will exclude the poor.146
143 Prepared by Sybil Shainwald, Esq.
144 Bermant & Woods, supra note 141, at 64. Currently, teleconferencing as a substitute
for physical appearances of out-of-state attorneys is often used by judges seeking to contain
costs. Cf Joseph P. Fried, 7V Speeds Cases From Police to Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
28, 1995, at B4 (describing expanding use of live videoconferencing-as a substitute for face
to face meetings--when police officers turn their cases over to prosecutors).
Bermant & Woods note that the capacity for "virtual" court appearances may have
another result: "Doctrines of personal jurisdiction may finally be freed from the territorialism
of the 19th Century, and 'venue' as a limitation on the power of the courts may disappear."
Bermant & Woods, supra note 141, at 64.
145 Bermant & Woods, supra note 141, at 64.
146 See, e.g., Stevan Alburty, It's a Buyer's Markespace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1995,
at A17 (op-ed); see also David S. Bennahum, Mr. Gingrich's Cyber-Revolutdon, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1995, at A19 (op-ed) (describing Rep. Gingrich's vision for cyberspace expansion as
"a recipe for widening the gap between information haves and have-nots").
Bermant and Woods note other values and goals potentially threatened by innovative
uses of technology to replace traditional court appearances: authenticity (erosion of tangible
sense of judicial power), legitimacy, dignity (loss of effectiveness of symbolic aspects of
formality of courts), control (some power would necessarily be ceded to the technical staft),
due process, and job satisfaction (udge's loss of personal contact with parties). Bermant &
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Increased dependence on computers and associated technology in
litigation must be accompanied by programs that provide schools and
libraries with computers and access to online services and adequate
instruction and assistance on their use.
d. Some Concluding Thoughts
Our point in describing these devices is to demonstrate that with the
right tools, complex disputes that should remain in the courts remain there.
The existing tools, however, are being stretched to their limits.
Procedural and substantive law must be updated, more than it has been,
to reflect changes in the ways in which the world does business. It is plain
common sense that, given the nationalization of markets, more people,
spread over a larger geographic region, are likely to be hurt if a product
proves defective. Yet current personal jurisdiction limits ignore the reality
of national markets. 147 It is stuck in a horse and buggy-or perhaps
Volkswagen-at a time when people-and products-routinely move in
planes. 148 Protection of the public through administrative agencies and
compensation through a health and security system offer a better alternative
to the tort system. 149
B. Expense and Delay
In comparison to traditional litigation, ADR is said to require less time
to achieve a disposition, to cost less and to result in substantively better
outcomes (since all parties will find the resolution at least mildly
acceptable). 150 Other aspects of its superiority are said to be its ability to tap
Woods, supra note 14, at 67.
147 See In re DES Cases (Ashley v. Abbott Laboratories), 789 F. Supp. 552, 571-73
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); id. at 576 ("[Where substantive law has undergone significant
development to accommodate socioeconomic change, it is necessary to interpret jurisdictional
law so that it meets the demands of the subject matter of the jurisdiction."); Julia Christine
Bunting, Ashley v. Abbot Laboratories: Reconfiguring he Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in
Mass Ton Litigation, 47 VAND. L. REv. 189, 223 (1994) ("In eliminating the minimum
contacts requirement from its jurisdictional analysis, the Ashley court acknowledged that
territorial-based contacts analysis does not reflect modem social and economic activity.");
Sheila L. Birnbaum & Gary E. Crawford, Jurisdiction Ruling Charts New Course, NAT'L
LJ., June 22, 1992, at 18 (discussing Ashley); See Redish & Beste, supra note 113.
14 8See Acohido, supra note 32, at El (describing the boom in air freight to transport
products).
14 9 WENSTN, INDMDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 163-71.
150 See, e.g., Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation Is a Cost-Ffflcient, 71mely Way to Avoid
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experts as dispute resolvers in the substantive field of the dispute, and the
ability of the parties to include "intangibles" in the resolution.151
With respect to ADR's cost and delay-reducing potential, the actual
benefits of ADR, and court-annexed programs in particular, are not clear
given a lack of empirical data. 152 Delay in the courts is a problem, 153
although one that has been somewhat overstated. 154 There is some evidence
that ADR programs in some instances may even increase the cost and
delay. 155 A higher than expected percentage of parties that have participated
in the federal courts' mandatory arbitration programs have subsequently
sought trial de novo. 156 Two ongoing studies-one by RAND and one by
Litigation, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at B-9 (suggesting use of mediation in Orange County
controversy); Debra C. Moss, Reformers Tout ADR Programs, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 28
(discussing delay reduction in Western District of Missouri's early assessment program). On
benefits of ADR, see generally J. Michael Keating, Jr., CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution,
Getting Reluctant Parties to Mediate, ALTERNATIVES, Jan. 1995, at 9, 10 (privacy, timeliness,
reduction of transaction cost, better understanding of the case); CPR LEGAL PROGRAM,
NATIONAL FRANCHISE MEDIATION PROORAM 3 (1993) (savings in legal fees and other
litigation expenses, promptness of resolution, preservation of business relationships, creative,
business-driven results, privacy and confidentiality). But see Galanter & Cahill, supra note 16
(settled resolutions are not necessarily substantively better than litigated ones).
151 See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Judicial Referral to ADR; Issues and Problems
Faced by Judges, FJC DIRECTIONS, Dec. 1994, at 8, 11; cf. Daragahi, supra note 82, at 5
(describing growth of panels of experts familiar with environmental legal issues).
152 See Dayton, supra note 2, at 916 (using multivariate analysis to conclude that
"claims concerning ADR's potential to reduce costs and delays are greatly exaggerated");
Editorial, Mandatory ADR: Can We Talk, 78 JUDICATURE 272, 272 (1995) (noting lack of
empirical support for some claims about ADR). The lack of empirical data examining the
phenomenon is widely bemoaned; cf. WOOLF REPORT, supra note 2 , at 141 ("Arbitration is,
however, often criticized as being no quicker or cheaper than litigation because it has become
over-dominated by court procedures."). See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Why We Don't Know
More About the Civil Justice System-and What We Could Do About It, U.S.C. LAW, Fall
1994, at 10 (lack of institutional structure to support sustained empirical research into the civil
justice system).
153 See generally BAKER, supra note 90 (discussing delay in the federal courts of
appeals and proposals to accommodate the volume of cases).
154 C. discussion of litigation explosion, supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
155 See Stienstra & Willging, Alternatives, supra note 2, at 31.
156 Id. (requests were made in 60% of cases). Whether the arbitration was successful
will effect participant attorneys' perceptions of the cost saving. An earlier report indicated that
attorneys in cases that were successfully arbitrated thought that there were costs savings, while
those for whom arbitration was not successful found none, but still felt the costs were
"reasonable." Barbara S. Meierhoefer, Court-Annexed Arbitration in Ten District Courts
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the Federal Judicial Center-will soon aid in evaluating such programs. 157
C. Disaffection with the "Adversarial" Model
Those who criticize traditional litigation have a narrow view of what it
has been, and what it can be. ADR, with its focus on problem-solving
tactics, is often posited as the opposite of litigation, with its assumption and
exploitation of the parties' presumed pursuit of self-interest. 158 The
involved "facilitator" in ADR is said to be the opposite of the detached
"umpire" in litigation.
The dichotomy in the literature and in public policy discussions that is
set up with ADR on the one side and traditional litigation on the other is
largely false. 159 In practice, most traditional litigation is not text-book
"adversarial" litigation. It has more in common with the purportedly gentler
alternative dispute resolution forms. 16
(Federal Judicial Center 1990), at 93.
157 See Moss, supra note 150, at 30. One report, to be written by the Federal Judicial
Center, will study five districts including the Northern District of California and the Western
District of Missouri. The other, to be conducted by the RAND's Institute for Civil Justice,
will study 10,000 cases in 10 pilot and control districts.
158 See, e.g., Paul T. Wangerin, The Political and Economic Roots of the "Adversary
System" of Justice and "Alternative Dispute Resolution", 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. REsoL. 203,
203-06 & nn.l-13 (1994); Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attomey-Client
Privilege: In Search of An Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, The Adversary System,
and the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINOs L.J. 495, 503 (1982);
see also Stienstra & Willging, Alternatives, supra note 2, at 14 (noting "winner take all"
nature of litigation).
159 See Galanter, supra note 16, at xiii.
Most ADR is not located in autonomous institutions that operate independently of the
norms and sanctions of the legal system. Instead ADR is typically situated near legal
institutions and dependent upon legal norms and sanctions. Correspondingly, most of
what goes [on] in and around courts is not 'traditional litigation' if that means the
decisive application of legal norms to fully presented cases. Instead we find
maneuvering, bargaining, and (often) mediation in the shadow of possible adjudication
- and the expense and risk of obtaining it. That ADR and adjudication reside in distinct
normative worlds is a persistent element in a mythology of the partisans of each, in spite
of ample evidence of the pervasive continuities.
Id.
160 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Clvic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic
State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1543-44 (1992).
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Especially since the revisions of Rule 16, judges, or their surrogates
(special masters, magistrate judges and the like), have had to take on an
active role in assisting the parties settle their disputes. Along the way,
traditional litigation has picked up some of the attributes commonly
associated with ADR.
The United States is not alone in moving towards a model of litigation
that encourages settlement. A recent report prepared by Lord Woolf
analyzing the current rules and procedures of the civil courts in England and
Wales concluded that "the philosophy of litigation should be primarily to
encourage early settlement of disputes."161
1. Judges
There has been, and must continue to be, a shift from the traditional
Anglo-American jurisprudential view that the common-law judge is an
oracle on high, muffled in the black robe of anonymity, uttering the law and
deciding the facts without involvement. 162 Despite some theoretical and
practical objections to an active role by trial judges, 163 the court has an
obligation to the integrity of the process itself-under the Federal Rules as
well as the current practice-that requires active and direct involvement. 164
161 WOOLF REPORT, supra note 2, at 5; see id. at 20 (importance of keeping parties
informed throughout the proceeding of the costs and "any alternative means of resolving"
their conflict). Bt see Galanter & Cahill, supra note 16 (suggesting that settled resolutions are
not necessarily superior to litigated ones).
162 See Susan M. Gabriel, Judicial Participation in Settlement: Pattern, Practice, and
EthFcs, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 81 (1988); Adams, supra note 99, at 442-43 & n.101
(noting changing perceptions of judicial role); Hogan, supra note 35, at 430-35; Susan K.
Antalovich, Note, Heileman Brewing Co. Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corporation: Defining the
Perimeters of Judicial Involvement in the Settlement Process, 5 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
115, 115-18 (1989).
163 See Gabriel, supra note 162; Hogan, supra note 35, at 115-18 (summary of some of
the objections to an active judicial role); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 376 (1982) (broad critique of rise of "managerial" judging and analysis of potential for
erosion of procedural safeguards); Warshawsky, supra note 17 (description of potential for
judicial coercion and other ethical problems); Antalovich, supra note 162, at 136 (deseription
of potential coerciveness ofjudicial involvement in settlement); Gabriel, supra note 17, at 81-
82, 89-95 (identification of some ethical problems ofjudicial involvement in settlement).
164 "Mhe advent of 'managerial judging' can be characterized as a form of ADR in
which judges attempt to preside over the negotiation and settlement of a case through efforts at
moral suasion backed by the possible use of adjudicatory power." Jeffrey W. Stempel, New
Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and
Litigation Reform, 59 BROoK. L. REV. 659, 673 (1993). Asked about whether "ADR
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The notion of the judge as a detached umpire impassively speaking out
the law as needed does not mesh with the reality of judges' participation.
The amendments to Rule 16 anticipate the judge's active intervention, either
directly or through surrogates, to push the case to trial or settlement.1 6
5
Moreover, intervention may be required to fulfill the courts' "equalizing"
role; the judge is the instrument through which that aspect of the courts'
work is exercised-any redress of imbalances depends on the judge's
initiative to perceive and rectify them. 66
This activist role is especially critical in the class action context. There
it has been said the court is a "fiduciary for the absent class and the ultimate
guardian of its interests." 167 The number of "clients" may be extremely
large, the class members may be widely scattered and individual members
may have little or no contact with their attorneys, and little ability to
monitor actions lawyers may take binding some or all class members. 168 In
the absence of involved plaintiffs, it falls to the judge to ensure that class
counsel have the capacity and the will to do the job, and that any settlement
achieved is "fair, reasonable and adequate." 169
The judge must also be attentive to-and ready to act on behalf of-the
interests of the larger community of nonlitigants who will be impacted by a
settlement or other resolution.170 The court may convene public hearings to
ensure that those forging the settlement are aware of, and take into account,
the needs of family members, neighbors, community resource providers and
procedures should be used by federal courts in civil cases because in some cases they produce
fairer outcomes than traditional litiation," 52.7% of "All Circuit Judges" agreed and 29.7%
disagreed. See Oct. 1992 Survey of Federal Judges, supra note 94, at 21.
165 Rule 16 implies early intervention by the court in "facilitating the settlement of the
case." FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (5). See generally William L. Adams, Let's Make a Deal:
Effective Utilization of Judicial Settlements in State and Federal Courts, 72 OR. L. REv. 427,
430-35 (1993) (describing history of amendments to Rule 16).
166 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
167 See Lazos, supra note 2, at 320 & n.71. Lazos suggests that inherent conflicts of
interest between the class and its representatives are inherently so severe in relation to their
relative enthusiasm for settlement that the courts should supplement their oversight functions
by appointing a guardian ad litem for absent class members, pursuant to a proposed
modification to Rule 23. Id.
168 See generally WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 39-121. Jack B.
Weinstein, Ehical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REy. 469 (1994);
Michael D. Ricciuti, Note, Equity and Accountability in the Reform of Settlement Procedures
In Mass Tort Cases: 7he Ethical Duty to Consult, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 817 (1988).
169 See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, at 566
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (reviewing adequacy of stipulated settlement in Manville trust litigation).
17 0 See generally WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 92-101.
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others affected by plaintiffs injuries.
The "detached umpire" model does not mesh with the reality of the
judge's mental processes. Far from maintaining a tabula rasa, the judge
develops opinions about the case at different stages of the litigation. He or
she continually estimates the strength of the case, the competence of the
attorneys and the time required for a resolution. The judge must make these
assessments to fulfill his or her obligations under Rule 16 to move the case
to trial or settlement. 171 The fact that formal "pronouncements" are rare and
unmistakable, in the context of the extended give-and-take of the pretrial
process, does not mean that the judge is mentally detached and uninvolved.
2. Lawyers
The adversarial litigation model assumes-and is said to depend on-the
self-interest of the parties and the lawyers who represent them.172 Under the
ideal, truth is the elusive goal that emerges from a clash of single-minded
zealous advocates. 173
Some attorneys do fit the model, but many do not. Attorneys, and the
parties they represent, are capable of compromising their interests to some
degree in pursuit of larger social welfare. This is true even in the heat of
litigation, even from vigorously partisan players.
Lawyers often welcome the opportunity to make a contribution beyond
the bottom line. 174 Witness the malaise of many law students and lawyers
new to the profession. 175 Many of them do not relish the idea of devoting
171 This aspect of the judge's involvement is critical in the class action contexts, where
decisions must be made at various stages-whether or not to certify the class; whether notice
of an event in the class action's prosecution must be distributed to the class-that tacitly
implicate the judge's sense of the merits of the case and its future direction. See generally
Jack B. Weinstein & Karin S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave: Some Problems of Judges in
Dealing with Class Action Settlements, 163 F.R.D. 369 (1995).
172 See supra note 158 and accompanying text (models of the adversarial system).
173 See Rosenfeld, supra note 158, at 503-04. Compare the following general policy of
the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York, Alternatives for Resolving Disputes, 44TH
STRtEz NoTEs, Apr. 1996, at 2 ("Each practicing member of this Association should be
knowledgeable about alternative dispute resolution processes, and should advise the member's
clients of the availability of any appropriate alternatives to litigation so such clients can make
an informed choice concerning resolution of present and prospective disputes."). See also
Yaroslav Sochynaky, How to Approach a Client About Mediation, N.Y. L.J. Sept. 7, 1995, at
3.
174 C. Tobin Harshaw, Making Layers Usefid, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Dec. 25, 1994
(enthusiasm of law students for "problemsolving" mode of dispute resolution).
175 C. Terrell & Wildman, supra note 39.
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their lives to dealing with clients whose interests may be petty and selfish.
Perhaps the most radical departure from the traditional adversarial
model is the use of the "settlement class action." In a settlement class
action, the class action complaint is filed together with its proposed
resolution. This was the device that was used in the Manville Trust and the
breast implant litigation. It requires substantial communication and
consensus-building between the adversaries-possibly with the involvement
of court personnel-before they formally file dispositive papers. The judge
still must review the merits of the class action according to the traditional
criteria specified in Rule 23. It is essential to ensure that any settlement
approved is not the product of collusion favoring the defendant and
attorneys at the expense of the class.17
6
3. Parties
There is the tendency to conceive of plaintiffs in traditional litigation,
like their attorneys, as mired in a single-minded pursuit of a money
judgment. This characterization denigrates the complex economic,
psychological and personal reasons that bring plaintiffs into court.
Sometimes the public airing of a grievance, or receipt of a public apology
from a corporate malefactor, is as important to a plaintiff as a cash sum.177
A plaintiff may also see the court process as a way to ensure that others do
not suffer the same misfortune. In any case, altruism may intermingle with a
desire for vindication, retribution and the cleansing effect of a public
hearing.
These are goals that can often be achieved more readily through court
supervised settlement than through extrajudicial dispute resolution. The
question remains, does our litigation system encourage recognition of the
kinds of dynamics that are at work? Are parties encouraged through the
litigation culture to take stronger positions than they feel, and to devalue
other forms of satisfaction in favor of a winner-take-all mindset?
D. Decisionmakers Who Lack Specialized Knowledge in the Area of
the Dispute
In many forms of alternative dispute resolution, the "dispute resolver"
is a person or body who is already familiar with the substantive area of the
dispute. For example, the coordinator of the Eastern District of New York's
ADR programs maintains lists of attorneys expert in various subject matters
176 see, e.g., Judge Rejects Accord Over Ford's Bronco, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 25, 1995,
at A7.
17 7 WONSTEN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 46.
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that can be tapped as "neutral evaluators" in the district's Early Neutral
Evaluation program. 1
7
Judges usually begin a litigation in a highly technical area with only a
general familiarity with the particulars of the industry involved in a dispute,
possibly supplemented by attendance at conferences or seminars. 179 But
judges may draw on a variety of resources to accommodate the technical
subject matter of a dispute.
In a complex litigation, where the judge must develop a sophisticated
understanding of the issues to perform the judicial functions properly, the
parties can be asked to provide experts to educate the judge about the
technical issues at stake.180 The author has used this procedure in a wide
variety of cases, including a DES case where the causal relationship
between the drug and some of plaintiffs' injuries is disputed. Such
conferences are useful to the parties as well as the judge; they provide dry
runs for the parties, who ultimately bear the burden of ensuring that a jury
of laypersons will understand the technical aspects of this case.
Judges may use the power to appoint a special master 1 to bring
already-developed skills into the dispute. In choosing a special master,
considerations which may be important are the person's political, technical,
economic, and social background which may be relevant; his or her
sophistication with respect to mediation and other forms of ADR, if the
appointment is to facilitate settlement; his or her knowledge of the
substantive area of law at the basis of the dispute; and his or her expertise in
a particular scientific area. 182 In addition to formally appointed special
masters, a judge may rely on amicus curiae, such as governmental and
178 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEw YORK at 7 (1992). See Report of ADR Administrator, Sept. 19,
1995, on the results of Compulsory Mediation in the U.S. Dist. Ct. for the East. Dist. of New
York, Sept. 19, 1995.
179 See Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges Learning, Speaking and Acting-Part I--
Tentative First Thoughts: How May Judges Learn?, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 539 (1994).
180 See WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 2 (describing this technique).
181 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text. See also Kenneth R. Feinberg,
Creative Use of ADR: The Court Appointed Special Master, 59 ALa. L. REV. 881 (1996).
Regularization of the mediator's ethical role is critical to this development. See, e.g., Irene
Stanley Said, The Mediator's Dilemma: The Legal Requirements Exception to Confidentiality
Under the Texas ADR Statute, 365 TEx. L. REV. 579 (1995).
182 See generally Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the
Judiciary or Reshaping Adjudication, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986); Margaret G. Farrell,
Coping With Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J. 927 (1994);
Margaret 0. Farrell, Te Role of Special Masters in Federal Litigation, 842 ALI-ABA 931
(Oct. 14, 1993).
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pubic interest bodies, to bring technical issues into sharp relief.
Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides additional authority
for bringing expertise into the courtroom.18 3 The author has used expert
panels in a broad array of civil and criminal cases-most recently, to project
the number of future asbestos claimants against the Manville Trust 84 and to
provide a "neutral evaluation" of expert statistical reports submitted by the
government and the defendant in a drug courier case. 1 5 Rule 706 is an
underutilized tool; its use is hampered by the difficulty that trial judges
encounter in attempting to identify reliable experts and in securing
compensation to pay for them.1 86 An effort is underway to educate judges
about the procedure and to develop a central resource to which judges can
refer for assistance in locating experts. 187
E. Insensitivity to Significance of Nonmonetary Intangibles to the
Litigants
An advantage of many forms of ADR over court adjudication is said to
be their ability to bring nonmonetary "intangibles" into the resolution of a
dispute. As already indicated, plaintiffs often are motivated by factors other
than the potential for monetary damages or the narrow forms of injunctive
relief that the courts may award. Many forms of ADR permit exploration of
creative resolutions not related to the bottom cash line that incorporate
intangibles such as public recognition of the plaintiff, a public apology by
the defendant, or some other vindication of a party's moral position. 188
183 See generally Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts:
Defining the Role of Experts Appointed Under Federal Rule of Evidence (Federal Judicial
Center 1993), at 706.
184 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y.
1995).
185 United States v. Shonubi, 895 F. Supp. 460 (E.D.N.Y. 1995). The problem in
Shonubi was how to project the amount of drugs carried in course of eight trips based on the
known quantity carried on the day the defendant was intercepted and profiles of other
intercepted drug couriers. Id.
186 See Cecil & Willging, supra note 183, at 21-22. Courts are reluctant to impose such
costs on the parties. See id. at 22, 57-65.
18 7 Weinstein, Lesson, supra note 2.
188 See Stienstra & Willging, Alternatives, supra note 2, at 14 (reviewing traditional
argument that '[i]nstead of adjudication's 'winner take all' outcome . . . mediation permits
parties to fashion more creative and mutually satisfactory outcomes"). See, e.g., Andrew
Pollack, Japanese Suits on H.LV.-Tainted Blood Settled, N.Y. TMWS, Mar. 15, 1996, at A31
(plaintiffs received apologies from blood product distributor. "Some plaintiffs have said they
wanted apologies from the government and the companies as much as they wanted
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Recall the custom in parts of Asia for the chairman of airline companies to
apologize publicly and offer full compensation to the victims and their
families following an airplane crash. 189
Consideration of such intangibles should and can be a greater part of
the court process, especially the court-supervised settlement process. Pursuit
of settlement is now recognized as an appropriate function of the courts. 19
It must be accompanied by an increased sensitivity to the diverse reasons
that propel plaintiffs into court, and a commitment to develop creative
solutions that respond to underlying human concerns.
IV. NON-TRADITIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. Court-Annexed Programs
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 requires each district court to
study its caseload and to consider ADR in designing its civil justice expense
and delay reduction plan. 19 1 The Eastern District of New York implemented
its Civil Justice Expanse and Delay Reduction Plan in 1991. This District
compensation." The government of Japan paid forty-four percent of costs.).
189 South Korean Plane Crashes in Storm; 66 Reported Killed, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
1993, at A6; see also JAS Officials to Be Punished for Crash, Japan Transportation Scan,
Apr. 26, 1993 (public apology by Japanese Transit Minister, lhei Ochi, "to the Japanese
people" following crash ofJAS DC-9).
190 See supra part TV. C.
191 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (creation of civil justice expense and delay reduction plans);
28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (consideration of ADR). ADR ia only one of six "principles and
guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction" that the district courts are
required to consider. The other factors include: "systematic, differential treatment of civil
cases" according to their complexity; "early and ongoing control of the pretrial process
through the involvement of a judicial officer" in assessing the case, controlling discovery and
setting motion deadlines and early, firm trial dates; series of conferences to explore the
parties' receptivity to settlement, to help frame the issues and to manage discovery;
encouragement of cooperative discovery devices; and imposition of certification requirements
of each party's good faith effort to reach agreement on matters set forth in discovery motions.
See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (1)-(5).
State legislatures and courts are also embracing ADR. According to the 1993 report of
the National Institute for Dispute Resolution, "'26 states and the District of Columbia are now
exploring or adopting ways by which local courts can routinely offer a range of dispute
resolution tools to settle most disputes that come before them.'" Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye,
Project Statement (on file). See also Today's News Update, N.Y. LJ., Sept. 6, 1995 (private
mediation group submitted plan for court-annexed family and divorce mediation requiring all
judges to inform litigants of availability of voluntary mediation services).
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had previously implemented a mandatory arbitration program in 1986 on its
own initiative, based on a successful Philadelphia plan. Upon filing the
complaint, each party is provided with a booklet detailing the district's
alternative dispute resolution procedures. 192 The program is coordinated by
a full-time staff lawyer in the clerk's office.
The Eastern District plan adds three ADR techniques to those already
provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under other
authority: 193 court-annexed mandatory arbitration for cases in which the
amount in controversy does not exceed $100,000;194 early neutral
evaluation (ENE);1 95 and court-annexed mediation. 196 In all cases, the
parties' rights to an adjudication before an Article III judge are preserved.
The results of the arbitration, mediation, or evaluation, or the reason a pro
se panel attorney turns down a case, remain confidential-even the judge is
192 See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK (1992)
[hereinafter EDNY ADR GUIDE].
193 These include consent to jury or court trial before a magistrate judge, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c), FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6), 73 & 76; settlement conferences conducted by a judge or
magistrate judge, FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5) & c (7); use of special masters, FED. R. CIV. P.
16(c) (6) & 53, and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (magistrate judge as special master).
194 Arbitration is mandatory in all civil cases in which the amount in controversy does
not exceed $100,000, subject to certain exclusions including social security, tax and prisoners'
civil rights claims and cases seeking equitable relief. Arbitrators are chosen randomly,
although where possible the program selects those who have experience in the substantive
field. See EDNY ADR GUIDE, supra note 192.
195 ENE is a "confidential, non-binding conference where the parties.., and their
counsel present the factual and legal bases of their case to one another and to an experienced
and impartial attorney with expertise in the subject matter of the case." Cases, which must
exceed $I00,000 in damages sought, are designated for ADR by either a magistrate or a
judge. The evaluator provides a nonbinding estimate of the liability and a range of damages,
attempts to identify areas of agreement and those that require resolution, and assesses the
strengths and weaknesses of each side's case. EDNY ADR GUIDE, supra note 192, at 5-6.
196 Mediation occurs only by consent of the parties. Litigants are offered an option of
choosing their mediator from the Court's panel, selecting a mediator on their own, or seeking
the assistance of a reputable neutral ADR organization. A mediator drawn from the court's
panel will generally have expertise in the area of law that is the subject matter of the case. The
mediator does not impose a judgement on the parties but rather seeks to help the litigants
consensually resolve their litigation. Fees for mediation are the responsibility of the parties.
EDNY ADR GUIDE, supra note 192, at 9-10. Still other forms of court-annexed ADR include
the "mini-trial" and the "summary jury trial." See generally Holly Bakke & Maureen
Solomon, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Selecting the Appropriate ADR Technique, COURT
ADMINISTRATION BULL., Aug. 1994, at 2-3; Haig & Caley, supra note 14.
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informed.
It is difficult to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the Eastern
District's court-annexed ADR. Referral to arbitration is mandatory and
automatic for cases worth less than $100,O0.197 When arbitration is
successful, the case disappears from the assigned judge's docket. The
empirical data available suggest that cases referred to mandatory arbitration,
to ENE, or to mediation, tend to settle, and that less time is required for a
resolution. 198 Whether that is due to the nature of the cases referred, or to
the effectiveness of our ADR program, is not certain. The author's intuition
is that most would have settled without court intervention-though
somewhat more slowly. A "voluntary" instead of "compulsory" system,
199
with available review by an Article III judge, either of any settlement, or, in
the context of binding arbitration, of the informed nature and voluntariness
of the decision to enter into arbitration, is particularly useful. Care must be
taken that a compulsory system does not erode the parties' rights to a jury
trial. 200
A reflection of the emphasis on settlement is the court-sponsored
"settlement week." The United States District Court for the Western
District of New York experimented with such a program, 20 1 which was
reminiscent of earlier emphasis in many federal courts on intensive
settlement periods. No trials were held while "experienced members of the
federal bar" attempted to assist the parties in one hundred "carefully
selected cases" to reach settlement. 2 2 Parties were ordered by the court to
send someone with full authority to settle the case to the mediation
session. 203
19 7 See EDNY ADR GUIDE, supra note 192, at 4.
198 Roughly 90% of cases designated for mandatory arbitration have settled-many
before the arbitration hearing took place. ADR in the Eastern and Southern Districts,
FEDERAL BAR COUNCIL NEWS, Dec. 1994, at 9-10. Roughly half of those cases that
completed ENE have settled. Id. Of ten ENE mediations conducted under the district's
mediation program, seven have settled. Id.
199 C. WOOLF REPORT, supra note 2, at 136, 143 (advocating voluntary rather that
compulsory ADR programs in context of reform of English and Welsh civil justice systems);
See generally Editorial, Mandatory ADR; Can We Talk, 78 JUDICATURE 272 (1995).
200 C. WOOLF REPORT, supra note 2, at 136 ("I do not think it would be right in
principle to erode the citizen's existing entitlement to seek a remedy from the civil courts, in
relation either to private rights or to the breach by a public body of its duties to the public as a
whole.").
201 Federal Court Plans Fall 1995 Settlement Week, N.Y.S. BAR J., July-Aug. 1995, at
50.
2 O2 id.
203 Id.
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Theoretically, privatization of court-annexed functions-by contracting
them out to a private dispute resolution provider-is possible.204 In response
to the growing popularity of ADR, specialized private arbitration-mediation
services-both profit and non-profit-have emerged. 20 5 With consent of the
parties, a court could refer a case to a private dispute resolution provider. It
would then be important for the court to retain some ability to review any
settlement reached and any agreement to seal documents in order to satisfy
its responsibilities as an "equalizer" of parties with resource imbalances, to
assure the settlement was not coercive, and to protect the public interest in
the case. 206 Courts can also serve as clearing houses for information about
private services without endorsing particular forms or providers. 207
If private arbitrators and mediators are to be entrusted with resolving
disputes that implicate broad social issues, then they cannot take a narrow
and parochial view with respect to their responsibilities. 20 8 Arbitrators in
204 See William K. Slate II, Courr-Annexed ADR Systems, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 5, 1995, at 3
(advocating privatization of court-annexed mediation, and diversion of "a significant number
of large, time-consuming cases" to existing dispute resolution providers); WOOLF REPORT,
supra note 2, at 143 (advocating use of existing private dispute resolution facilities rather than
development of a new system of court-annexed ADR); Harold Baer, Jr., Mediation-Now is
the 7Tme, LITIO., Summer 1995, at 5.
205 See, e.g., advertisement for JAMS/ENDISPUTE, a new private ADR services
provider, N.Y. LJ., Oct. 21, 1994, at 3. Martindale-Hubbell recently published its first
dispute resolution directory, which lists more than 60,000 professionals-judges, attorneys,
law firms and other experts-involved in dispute resolution. CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION, Martindale-Hubbell Publishes Dispute Resolution Directory, ALTERNATIVES TO
TH HIGH COSTS OF LIOATION, Jan. 1995, at 3; see generally Section of Dispute Resolution
of the Public Services Division Governmental Affairs Group, American Bar Association, 1993
Dispute Resolution Program Directory (302-page book listing community dispute resolution
facilities).
Nonprofit agencies devoted to research and education on the benefits of ADR have also
emerged. For example, the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, a nonprofit agency,
publishes Alternatives to the High Costs of Litigation. The CPR Institute pioneered "taking the
pledge," an effort to sign up many corporations to a statement of principles that up-front in
any dispute they would suggest and/or try ADR. See Letter from Edwin J. Wesely to the Hon.
Jack B. Weinstein (Dec. 27, 1994) (on file with author). CPR's "Judicial Project" seeks to
provide ADR information, technical assistance and training to federal and state courts in
relation to the 1990 CIRA.
206 See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 66 (need for judicial oversight
of referral of cases to private dispute resolvers).
207 See Stienstra & Willging, Alternatives, supra note 2, at 50; WOOLF REPORT, supra
note 2, at 21.
208 C. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Professional Responsibility for Third-Pany Neutrals,
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significant cases should not look at themselves as nuts-and-bolts technicians,
but rather as public servants with broad social responsibilities-in practical
effect, as judges. A great strength of this country has been its sense of
responsibility to communities-partly because we have had enough assets
and have had more resources to distribute than other countries.
B. Residual Disputes Following Settlement
Somewhere between court-annexed and private ADR is the
incorporation of arbitration and mediation provisions in court-approved
settlements. For example, the settlement of the Manville Trust litigation
provides that disputes between the Trust and asbestos health claimants are to
be resolved by binding or non-binding arbitration. Only after a multi-step
process of dispute resolution has been completed may the claimant exit to
the court system. 20 9 In some class action settlements, the stipulated
settlement specifies the total amount to be contributed to a victims'
compensation fund but leaves to ADR the allocation of individual co-
defendants' contributions. 210
C. Repetitive Commercial Litigation
The cutting edge of ADR may be the development of intra-industry
ADR treaties. Under a typical agreement, all signatories consent to try ADR
before resorting to litigation. The nation's biggest banks, the Chemical
Manufacturers Association, and the Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers
Association, are currently considering adopting such treaties. 211 Intra-
industry agreements have already been signed by insurance, food and
commercial inventory finance businesses. 2 12 Courts appear willing to
broadly construe industry arbitration regulations. 213
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF LITIGATION, Sept. 1993, reprinted in JUDGE'S
DESKBoOK, supra note 2, at 91.
209 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Falise), 878 F. Supp. 473,
495, 581 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
210 See, e.g., CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution, Manufacturers Agree to Settlement
Plan 7hat Would Resolve Mass Tort Litigation, ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COSTS OF
LITIGATION, Jan. 1995, at 3 (proposed creation of $750 million settlement fund in Beeman v.
Shell Oil Co., with individual co-defendants' contributions to be determined by ADR).
211 Mike France, More Big Businesses Ask: Can We Talk, Not Sue, NAT'L LJ., Mar.
13, 1995, at B1.
212 Id.
213 See, e.g., McMahan Securities Co. v. Forum Capital Markets L.P., 35 F.3d 82, 88
(2d Cir. 1994) (citing "federal policy favoring arbitration," construes National Association of
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Such agreements do not raise the concerns implicated in large-scale
privatization of justice. 214 Presumably both sides of the dispute are almost
equally familiar with dispute-resolution facilities and their rights under the
contract governing their relationship. Courts need not monitor the dispute to
ensure that one side is not systemically exploited. The same types of
disputes are likely to recur, only rarely implicating national policy.
Preservation of an ongoing business relationship is at a premium, a factor to
which ADR is said to be more sensitive than traditional litigation.
D. Bloethical Disputes
Some controversial, but essentially personal disputes, are probably
better resolved privately. Here, the challenge is, institutionally, to support
private decisionmaking. Consider the issue of whether or not to terminate
life support, an issue on which we lack social consensus. This decision may
best be made by the treating physician, the patient, and the patient's family
and friends. 2 15 Recognizing that "thorny ethical issues are sometimes best
tackled from within," many hospitals and other health care providers have
created ethics committees or hired ethics consultants. 2 16 Encouraging
private consensus-building and public debate over applicable national
standards may be preferable to resorting to judge-made common law.
In highly technical areas, a judge may provide an impartial resolution,
but not necessarily an "informed" one. Disputes over narrow and highly
technical issues peculiar to a business community may best be resolved by
an expert or a panel of experts drawn from within the area of specialty.
Complete privatization of dispute resolution, with possible appeal to the
courts, may be desirable for business communities that are essentially self-
regulating-i.e., those that have their own standards, guidelines, and
enforcement mechanisms. 217 Of course, the courts may also draw on experts
Securities Dealers (N.A.S.D.) Code of Arbitration Procedure, which governs disputes
between members andlor associated persons of the N.A.S.D. in relation to disputes arising "in
connection with the [member's] business," broadly to cover employment disputes). See also
Gregg A. Paradise, Arbitration of Patent Infringement Disputes: Encouraging the Use of
Arbitration Through Evidence Rules Reform, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 247 (1995).
214 See supra part m.
215 On the courts' involvement in bioethical disputes, see generally Nancy Neveloff
Dubler, Introduction: Bioethics and Alternative Dispute Resolution, in MEDIATING
BIOETHICAL DIsPuTEs: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 1 (1994).
2 16 Id. at 4.
217 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy, 23 SW. U.
L. REV. 443 (1994) (advocating decentralized lawmaking for the increasingly complex
economy that respects norms developed by specialized business communities). Cooter points
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from specific communities for a variety of functions, from special masters
and Rule 706 experts in traditional litigation, to mediators and arbitrators in
court-annexed ADR programs. 218
E. Administrative Agencies with Appropriate Court Review
Some issues that merit centralized decisionmaking are appropriately
handled in the first instance by the administrative agencies with appropriate
review by the courts. 2 19 The administrative agencies are particularly
appropriate for high-volume repetitive disputes that are fact-intensive where
the law is fairly settled, for example, in the social security, 220 worker's
compensation, 22 1 and landlord-tenant areas. 222 The possibility of review by
an Article III trial court assures not only oversight of the decisionmaking
practice but that legal issues needing greater public consideration will
receive it.223 It seems doubtful that an appeal to a court of appeals is
necessary, except on certification by the trial or appellate court.
F. Ombudspersons
Private and public ombudspersons schemes can help relieve the pressure
on the courts without sacrificing the parties' rights to a public adjudication
to self-regulating professions, such as law and accounting, and "formal networks like Visa
[that] promulgate their own rules."). Id. at 445.
218 See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
219 See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2, at 33 ("Recommendation 10:
Where constitutionally permissible, Congress should assign to administrative agencies or
Article I courts the initial responsibility for adjudicating those categories of intensive federal
benefit or regulatory cases that typically involve intensive fact-finding.").
220 See Jack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disability Cases in the
Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 906-15 (1984).
221 See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. COM. L. §§ 300.1-300.34 (1994).
222 In New York, for example, the New York State Department of Housing and
Community Renewal power extends to certain forms of disputes. See, e.g., Powers Assocs. v.
New York State, 626 N.Y.S.2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
223 Recent initiatives to limit appellate review of administrative judges' decisions by
Article MII courts in Social Securities cases, for example, might be extremely detrimental to the
defrauded. See Fretz & Zelenske, supra note 66, at 1262-63 ("If appellate jurisdiction is
limited to discretionary review of legal issues, without the background an experience acquired
through the review of individual cases, the important role played by the circuit courts in
guiding the direction of national standards in the disability arena will be diminished."). Yet, a
certification by either the trial or appellate court might suffice while reducing unnecessary
appeals.
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by resolving disputes before they become full-blown. In his report on the
English and Welsh civil justice systems, Lord Woolf advocated a
government investigation into, and encouragement of increased
ombudsperson schemes.2 -4 He explained:
In addition to their obvious function of handling individual
grievances, the ombudsmen, chiefly through the publication of annual
reports, also have an important role in setting and maintaining standards
of good practice within their specialist sectors. The courts, which have a
broad general jurisdiction and do not share the ombudsmen's investigative
powers, are less well equipped to take on functions of this kind.27-
In Nassau County, for example, we have a comprehensive scheme of
voluntary, trained ombudspersons for our adult and old age homes. They
serve well in redressing and moderating disputes and tensions of families
and clients.Y 6
VI. ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL CASES
In considering ADR and the criminal law, our first question relates to
the difference in receptivity to procedural innovation in civil and criminal
cases. Here, we must ask, what is the basic dispute resolution technique
from which we are departing?
1. The Civil Case Model
In civil cases, our model remains essentially litigations conducted
according to the liberal federal rules developed in 1938. The merger of law
and equity in 1938 resulted in a substantial loosening of traditional non-
equity rules, and made it easier for plaintiffs to utilize our civil justice
system. Debate over the future direction of civil procedure points to a
procedural system that is fluid enough to accommodate society's eternal
flux, but constant enough to provide some predictability of operation and
fairness in individual cases.
Civil litigation has changed to reflect the increasing importance that we
place on the continuity of business relationships and avoidance of
224 WOOLFREPORT, supra note 2, at 111, 137, 139-41.
225 Id.
226 Interview with Evelyn Weinstein, Director, Nassau County Ombudservice, August
20, 1995. C. WOOLF REPORT, supra note 2, at 140 (advocating for referral of cases and
issues between "public ombudsmen* and the courts). But see Betty Rosenzweig, Federal
Budge: Cuts 7hrecten Ombudservice, GREAT NECK RECORD, Aug. 31, 1995, at I.
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psychological stress. The courts are no longer simply viewed as controlled
forums for legal "jousting." A premium is placed instead on institutional
support for facilitated communication. We see this sensitivity to psychology
and to preserving relationships in the parallel movement to resolve
matrimonial disputes in alternative fora. ADR reflects a pervasive
illustration of how we are rethinking civil procedure. It reflects an
imaginative response to new problems and a refusal to be bound by
traditional techniques.
2. The Criminal Case Model
Criminal procedure has been much more static-perhaps because so
much of it is influenced by constitutional requirements. The system begins
with criminalization of certain activities, followed by indictment,
prosecution, and prison if convicted. There are minor variations from this
model, including imposition of fines and restitution. While the words have
changed, the model has pretty much remained the same.
In criminal cases, we are seeing the effects of some movement towards
greater rigidity and harshness in substantive law. Consider the popularity of
"three strikes" laws, sentencing guidelines, and statutorily mandated
minimum sentences. The country is relying upon more prisons, more prison
time, and more fixed sentencing criteria. The current approach represents a
significant abandonment of some innovations that reflected liberalization,
such as release on the defendant's own recognizance in anticipation of
dismissal and reliance on juvenile courts. It would seem as if the criminal
and civil vessels of justice are passing in the night, going in opposite
directions.
In fact, however, there is a great deal of alternate dispute resolution in
criminal law since the vast bulk of cases are settled without trial. A large
proportion of possible cases are resolved when the prosecutor declines
prosecution, often with arrangements for restitution and "voluntary"
compliance with tax or environmental laws.227 Once the prosecution is
formally begun, plea agreements or arrangements for reduced sentences to
circumvent the Guidelines under federal law are common. 228 In jurisdictions
like New York, where private criminal complaints are possible, mediation
22 7Daragahi, supra note 82, at 5; J. Kevin Healy, Making Environmental Mediation a
Reality in New York, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 6, 1995 at 1.
228 See United States v. Aguilar, 884 F. Supp. 88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that,
through practice of "sentence bargaining," an entire class of cases falls outside the
Guidelines); U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 (permitting sentence below Guidelines range when defendant
cooperates with prosecution).
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programs have reduced the burden on the courts. 229
One reason ADR in criminal cases has not received greater attention is
that there is no one to speak for criminals and few to speak for particular
victims. Corporations and litigants are well represented--consider the
current dialogue in Washington over tort reform and environmental
regulation. Those involved can force us to evaluate how well the system is
working, to examine the costs and benefits, and to take a fresh look at the
pragmatic devices needed to solve real problems.
There is no analogous substantive voice in the criminal law. The
criminal bar, which benefits every time more repressive criminal legislation
is passed, 230 has not asked the practical questions about how to use our
social resources appropriately to avoid unnecessary cruelties, nor has it
produced cost-benefit analyses. The substantial advance in the civil area
over the criminal area is largely due to the lack of political power and
research and development in the latter.
Another reason for the rigidity in the criminal law is that the-
government can control it more readily. Criminalization and punishment has
traditionally been considered a monopoly of the government. By contrast, it
is considered to be desirable to give the business world the maximum
opportunity to make its own rules unless they clearly run afoul of
government policy.
Does it make sense to approach civil and criminal litigation so
differently? Might not more study and controlled flexibility in the criminal
justice system be desirable? Are there not sociological changes that need to
be accommodated by both systems?
Particularly in the area of the family, a sociological revolution is taking
place. The family has been changing for a number of reasons beyond the
scope of this paper. We see this in almost every drug case that passes
through the courtroom. 23 1 These changes have impacts in both criminal and
civil litigations, particularly in matrimonial cases. 232
229 Report of the Chief Administrative Judge of New York Courts for 1993, 37 (1994)
(community dispute resolution centers); Henry J. Reske, Victim-Offender Mediation Catching
On, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995 at 14; Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY LJ. 1247 (1994).
230 Cy. Joe Sexton, Talk About Pain and Suffering; Court Street's Personal-Injury
Lawyers See a Grim Future, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at A37 (noting that while the
Guiliani administration's initiatives on crime are expected to create work for criminal lawyers,
the outlook for tort lawyers is grim in light of anticipated tort reform legislation).
231 See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 885 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (recognizing the
importance of extended family ties, particularly where "nuclear family"is absent) and sources
cited therein.
232 See, e.g., Kenneth B. Wilensky, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Matrimonial
o)02
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There is a danger that the courts will be complicit in the destruction of
the family-this most important building block for social stability. One
culprit is the rigidity of the sentencing guidelines. The federal guidelines
direct judges not to consider the sex of the defendant in sentencing, and
note further that "family ties" are not "ordinarily" relevant in
sentencing. 233 In this time of increasingly fragile social connections and
pervasive anomie, "family ties" are almost always relevant. 234 If we can
preserve a family unit, while still meeting the goals of incapacitation,
rehabilitation and deterrence, then we should do so.
What is needed is more flexibility and creativity in dealing with
criminal activity, not less. The open minded analysis of ADR in civil
matters needs to be employed in criminal matters where excessive reliance
on fixed sentences and long incarcerations has created unnecessary tensions
and costs. Devices such as alternatives to prison, treatment as a substitute
for prevention, decriminalization with civil administrative penalties, and the
use of mediation need to be considered. 235
V. CONCLUSION
The legal profession, and particularly the courts, exist to serve the
people. We can resolve many of the tensions in our society more
effectively, both by improving court procedures, and by some privatization
of dispute resolution.
We cannot forget, however, that in a democracy such as ours, the
obligation for making law and for changing substantive balances among
members of our society lies ultimately with members of our elected and
Cases, N.Y.L.J., June 7, 1995, at 1; A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON MEDIATION, SECTION OF
FAMILY LAW, DIvORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE (1986); Dan
Trigoboff, More States Adopting Divorce Mediation, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 32.
233 See U.S.S.G. § 5hl.6 (policy statement).
234 See, e.g., Rose, 885 F. Supp. at 63 (noting importance of sentencing so as not to
harm innocent family members, including members of extended family); United States v.
Guiro, 887 F. Supp. 66, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (absence of community facility near defendant's
home increases difficulty of preserving family ties).
235 See PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 2. The proposed plan suggests some
of these approaches for criminal cases: allocate criminal jurisdiction carefully (offenses against
the federal government; with substantial multistate or international aspects; highly sensitive
local issues; and leave most criminal cases to the states). Id. at 23, 26 (Recommendations 2
and 4); Guidelines should be more sensitive to individual defendants and more amenable to
alternatives to incarceration. Id. at 56 (Recommendation 32). "More broadly, [the
Commission] should adopt guidelines that permit judges to take into account a greater number
of offender characteristics and impose more alternatives to incarceration." Id. at 57.
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appointed governmental legal institutions. The power to control the law and
justice cannot be permitted to seep out of the hands of the people through
privatization.

